Africa PORTS & SHIPS maritime news 26-27 July 2026 - Africa Ports

News continues belowPanorama:CMA CGM JEAN GABRIELCMA CGM Jean Gabriel Durban Picture by Trevor Jones Click image to enlargeAfricaPorts & ShipsA recent caller at the port of Durban was the French container. . .

By Terry Hutson · July 26, 2026 · 47 min read

News continues belowPanorama:CMA CGM JEAN GABRIELCMA CGM Jean Gabriel Durban Picture by Trevor Jones Click image to enlargeAfricaPorts & ShipsA recent caller at the port of Durban was the French container shipCMA CGMJEAN GABRIEL (IMO 9729128), which is currently deployed on CMA CGM’s Safari/Shaka service, connecting Asia with Southern Africa and explaining her recent call in South Africa. CMA CGM Jean Gabriel is 300 metres in length and 49m in width with a deadweight of 109,600 tonnes. The ship’s container capacity is reported as 10,926 TEUs. CMA CGM was built in China in 2018 at the COSCO Heavy Industries yard at Yangzhou. The ship is registered in Malta whose flag she flies. The service she operates in, CMA CGM’s Safari I/Shaka Express 2 is a joint loop with Maersk, Evergreen, COSCO and OOCL. This picture is by Trevor JonesAdded 26 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowCape Town MPT – FPT’s position compared with DurbanCape Town Multi Purpose Terminal, berth B-D. Picture: Transnet Click image to enlargeAfricaPorts & ShipsTransnet National Ports Authority’s decision to advertise a concession for Cape Town’s Multi‑Purpose Terminal (MPT), covering berths B–D, has raised questions among port stakeholders. The concern stems from the fact that these berths are already operated by FPT Group (Pty) Ltd, a private company specialising in citrus exports, under a lease that runs until 2027. FPT handles the bulk of Cape Town’s fruit exports, including all citrus shipped in specialised reefer vessels, and is widely regarded as an efficient operator. Industry observers note the contrast with Durban, where Transnet earlier this year extended FPT’s lease on the large terminal at the T‑Jetty directly, without advertising the facility to other bidders. That arrangement was presented as continuity for exporters and recognition of FPT’s established role. In Cape Town, however, Transnet has opened the process to competition, inviting applications from any interested party. Stakeholders question why FPT’s well‑functioning operation is being treated differently, with some warning that uncertainty could disrupt South Africa’s citrus export chain. The comparison between Durban and Cape Town highlights an apparent policy inconsistency in Transnet’s approach to private operators, and exporters are watching closely to see how the Cape Town tender unfolds. Added 26 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowMSC launches Afungi Shuttle to support LNG projectMSC Afrungi Shuttle service. Ckick image to enlargeAfricaPorts & ShipsMSC Mediterranean Shipping Company has announced the launch of a new feeder service dedicated to Mozambique’s LNG development in Cabo Delgado. The service, branded the Afungi Shuttle, will connect Afungi with Nacala and Maputo, providing a direct maritime link for construction materials, machinery, and project cargo. The shuttle began operations on 22 July 2026, offering rotations between Nacala–Afungi–Nacala and Maputo–Afungi–Maputo. MSC says the service will simplify logistics for customers by allowing the coastal leg to be included in a single booking, with one commercial point of contact. The feeder links Afungi into MSC’s global network, covering Europe, the Mediterranean, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. Afungi, situated on the coast of Cabo Delgado Province in northern Mozambique, is the onshore base for the Mozambique LNG project. The site hosts liquefaction trains, storage tanks, and export facilities for the $20 billion development led by TotalEnergies. The project will process gas from the Golfinho and Atum fields in Offshore Area 1, with a planned capacity of 13. 12 million tonnes per year once fully operational. MSC’snew shuttle is expected to strengthen supply chains into northernMozambique, where overland transport has been complicated by insurgency and limited road capacity. By providing structured maritime access, the service supports both the LNG project’s construction phase and the wider economic integration of Cabo Delgado into Mozambique’s trade routes. Added 26 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowIMO Secretary-General:Statement on recent attacks on ships in the Red SeaPicture: www. imo. org IMO ©. Click image to enlargeEdited byPaul RidgwayAfricaPorts & ShipsLondonOn 23 July the Secretary-General of the IMO Mr Arsenio Dominguez, issued the following statement:“I unequivocally condemn the latest reported attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea area. These attacks are indefensible. They endanger the lives of seafarers, while threatening the security of international shipping, the marine environment and the stability of global supply chains. IMO Secretary-General Mr Arsenio Dominguez addressing IMO Sub Committee III 12. Picture: www. imo. org IMO ©. “Seafarers are civilians performing essential work that sustains economies and communities worldwide. Ship operators must thoroughly assess risks before transiting the region. Seafarers must never be placed in harm’s way or targeted in situations of conflict or instability. “I also renew my call for the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers who continue to be held captive following piracy attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region. Ensuring their safety is a fundamental obligation under international law and a shared responsibility of the global community. “The Red Sea is a critical maritime corridor for international trade. Continued attacks on shipping in this region risk escalating tensions, further disrupting commercial routes and undermining the principle of freedom of navigation. “De-escalation is the only solution. “I am equally concerned about the potential pollution from these reported incidents in the Red Sea and previous incidents in the Strait of Hormuz area. IMO will continue to monitor the situation and stands ready to assist as necessary. ”Added 26 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowEgypt and Eritrea assert littoral sovereignty over Red Sea securityAI generated for AP&S Click image to enlargeAfricaPorts & ShipsEgypt and Eritrea have moved firmly to assert the primacy of Red Sea littoral states in determining the future of maritime security in the region, issuing a joint declaration that rejects any external attempts to impose access or enforcement measures in violation of international law. The statement followed high-level talks in Cairo between Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and his Eritrean counterpart Osman Saleh, during which both sides underscored that the Red Sea’s governance must remain the exclusive responsibility of its coastal nations. The ministers warned against unilateral initiatives by non-littoral actors, framing such moves as infringements on sovereignty and destabilising to regional order. This declaration comes at a time of heightened tension in the Red Sea, with the Houthi movement in Yemen escalating attacks on Saudi shipping. As Saudi Arabia itself is a littoral state, the Cairo–Asmara position highlights the determination of neighbouring powers to resist external naval policing while reinforcing their own claim to stewardship of one of the world’s most strategic waterways. Egypt, long attuned to the Red Sea’s role in its national security, linked the issue directly to the stability of the Horn of Africa. Eritrea, meanwhile, emphasised the need for cooperative frameworks among coastal states to safeguard maritime trade and navigation. Together, the two countries presented a united front against what they described as violations of international law by outside powers seeking to dictate security arrangements. Beyond security, the talks also advanced bilateral cooperation. Egypt pledged to expand investment in Eritrea across mining, infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, fisheries, and housing, while both sides agreed to activate a maritime transport agreement signed earlier this year in Asmara. Capacity-building initiatives, including training and technical support through Egypt’s Agency of Partnership for Development, were also announced. For Africa Ports & Ships readers, the Cairo–Asmara declaration marks a significant moment in the evolving geopolitics of the Red Sea. It signals a tightening alignment among littoral states determined to safeguard sovereignty at a time when global trade routes are under threat, and when external actors may seek to expand their naval footprint in response to conflict. Added 26 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowSaudi Tanker hit in Red Sea as Houthi attacks resumeSaudi Arabia, Yemen and the Red Sea. Map: TUBS Wikipedia Commons CC BY-SA 4. 0AfricaPorts & ShipsMaritime authorities have confirmed that a Saudi‑flagged tanker was struck by a missile in the southern Red Sea, igniting a fire onboard and raising fears of renewed disruption to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. The vessel, the Encelia (IMO 9240172), was attacked while transiting near the Saudi port of Jizan in southren Saudi Arabia. According to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) centre and risk analysts at Vanguard, the tanker transmitted a distress call after being hit by what is believed to have been a Houthi missile. Crew members fought the blaze at the bow, with no casualties reported and no confirmed oil spill. Second Vessel Reported, But UnconfirmedSeparately, Houthi sources claimed a second strike on the tanker Layla. However, details remain unclear, with no independent verification and suggestions that the report may be recycled from an earlier incident. Saudi authorities have not confirmed damage to the vessel. Strategic EscalationThe attack marks a dangerous escalation of the US–Iran war, extending into the Red Sea through Iran’s Yemeni proxy, the Houthis. The group has previously threatened to target Saudi‑linked shipping in retaliation for Riyadh’s blockade of Yemen. The Red Sea is a critical artery for global trade, with the Bab el‑Mandeb Strait at its southern end carrying around 12% of world commerce and a quarter of container traffic. Disruption here compounds the near‑closure of the Strait of Hormuz, where shipping has already been curtailed by conflict. Strait of HormuzEarlier this week UKMTO reported an attack on the Greek product tanker Kavomaleas (IMO 1042823) near the Strait of Hormuz. The tanker, operated by Greece’s Dynacom Tankers Management, occurred abut eight nautical miles northwest of Kumzar in Oman. The vessel, which was built only last year, was struck by a missile, causing a fire that forced the crew to abandon their ship. They were later rescued by a passing tug. Market and Shipping ImpactFollowing the attack, several tankers diverted north toward the Suez Canal, while insurers are expected to raise war‑risk premiums for voyages through the southern Red Sea. Brent crude prices surged above US$95 per barrel, reflecting heightened concerns over energy supply security. The confirmed strike on the Encelia underscores how maritime trade is increasingly caught in the crossfire of regional conflict. With both Hormuz and Bab el‑Mandeb under threat, global shipping faces one of its most precarious moments in decades. For operators, the challenge is not only rerouting vessels but absorbing the rising costs and delays that come with navigating around two of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. Added 23 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowA sharp fall in gas supplies in 2028threatens South Africa’s economy:how to manage the falloutSouth Africa’s Durban harbour and Richards Bay could play a role in imports of LNG. Picture: TransnetDavies Tsikayi,University of the WitwatersrandSouth Africans are getting used to the term “gas cliff” as pressure ramps up for action to be taken ahead of expected gas shortages. Natural gas supplies fromMozambique’s Pande and Temanefields will begin to fall after 2028 as their production declines. The fields have suppliedroughly 90% of South Africa’s gas for more than two decades. Mechanical engineer and lecturer Davies Tsikayi sets out why the looming supply shortage poses serious risks for the country. What’s at stake?South Africa imports a significant share of the gas it consumes fromsouthern Mozambique. The gas comes from the Pande-Temane fields and moves through the Republic of Mozambique Pipeline Investments Company(Rompco) pipeline into South Africa’s Mpumalangaprovince. The gas cliff matters because gas is not simply another fuel in the energy mix. Although natural gas accounts foronly about 2. 5% of South Africa’s total energy supply, it carries strategic weight. Roughly 35%-40% of the gas from Pande-Temane is used in Sasol’s Secunda operations, where the South African chemicals and energy companyconverts coal and natural gas into synthetic fuels and chemical feedstocks. A further 35%-40% goes to Sasol’s chemicals complex at Sasolburg, where natural gas is used in production processes for chemicals including wax, methanol and ammonia. Thebalance is distributed to industrial and commercial users. Sasol also sells around 20-23 petajoules of methane-rich gas per yearto customers in South Africa, including manufacturers of steel, sugar, paper and pulp, and motors. This means the gas cliff should be understood not only as an issue of energy supply, but also as a risk in industrial policy, food security and manufacturing competitiveness. Globally, natural gas provides about70% of ammonia production and 55%-65% of methanol production. Ammonia underpins fertiliser. Fertiliser underpins food production. Methanol is a building block for chemicals and industrial value chains. In the South African context, gas also keeps furnaces, kilns, boilers and process plants running in sectors such as steel, glass, ceramics, brewing and synthetic fuels. A reduction in gas supply would therefore require more than a simple fuel switch. Affected firms may need to redesign production processes, install new storage and handling systems, absorb higher operating costs, and, in some cases, shift to alternatives with higher emissions profiles. The Industrial Gas Users Association of South Africa’s estimateis blunt: alternatives such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG), diesel or electricity could cost between double and five times what users currently pay for gas, before even accounting for the capital cost of conversion. The implications for industry and jobs are substantial. Industries reliant on this gas supply directly employ around70,000–100,000 people. Sasol’s wider contribution is even larger: in 2021, its contribution to the South African economy was estimated atabout 5% of GDP, supporting roughly 500,000 direct and indirect jobs. The country may need300-400 petajoules of gas per year – equivalent to 6-8 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) – to meet industrial heating and gas-to-power needs. Consequently, the current supply is simply not enough. Delay, in this context, is not a passive position. It increases the risk of higher prices, a weaker industry and greater energy insecurity. What needs to be done?The policy framework and infrastructure needed to import gas are advancing. The draft Gas Master Plan, which identifies Richards Bay in South Africa as a key LNG import location and considers Matola in Mozambique as a regional supply option, has been published. Meanwhile, the terminal projects at both locations have progressed through permitting, and offtake discussions are under way. However, each of these initiatives still requires years of work, while the buffer between the country’s current position and where it needs to be has steadily eroded. The gas cliff is now only a few years away, leaving very little room for further delay. The first and most urgent option is LNG imports. The independent, non-profit economic research institution Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS) produced a study in March 2026 on South Africa’s gas landscape. The study makes it clear that South Africa has no choice but to enable LNG imports in the short to medium term. Domestic resources may help later, but they cannot close the near-term gap. The LNG strategy must be practical, not symbolic. Durban and Richards Bay, two of South Africa’s most important commercial ports (in KwaZulu-Natal), could serve as LNG import terminals, but existing pipeline infrastructure is insufficient to supply inland demand. South Africa therefore needs a second import route via Mozambique, through the ports of Matola or Inhassoro, to connect into existing infrastructure serving the eastern interior. Matola is already more advanced, with permitting and environmental approvals granted. The report’s priority is a dual-terminal strategy: one LNG terminal in Mozambique to access Rompco and the inland gas market, and another in KwaZulu-Natal to serve LNG-to-power and KwaZulu-Natal industrial demand. Both must be secured and operational by mid-2030. Regional and domestic gas sources remain essential but are not immediate saviours. Timelines, cost, distance from infrastructure and regulatory delays mean current domestic resources cannot rescue South Africa before the cliff arrives. Demand-side measures also matter. Some users may shift to LPG, diesel, electricity, trucked LNG or compressed natural gas (CNG). Biomethane, green hydrogen and electrification may help in time. But the report is realistic: many alternatives are expensive, technically immature, logistically difficult, or higher-emitting. South Africa’s effective carbon tax,rising from R35/tonne (US$2) in 2024 to R115/tonne (US$7) in 2030, will not by itself force wholesale substitution. What policy decisions are required?South Africa needs a credible gas plan tied to procurement, infrastructure and industrial policy. The draftSouth Africa Gas Master Planhas already sketched the scale of possible future demand: about 400 petajoules a year inland by 2050 and a further 350 PJ a year in coastal regions. That planning must now become execution. The Department of Minerals and Energy, regulators, state-owned companies and private investors need a clear LNG-to-power strategy. It should set out how much gas the country needs, who will buy it, how it will be priced and stored, and how supply can be adjusted as demand changes. The regulatory system also needs reform. The TIPS report calls for clearer rules on what companies must assess before offshore oil and gas projects can receive environmental approval. It also proposes a specialist tribunal to resolve disputes over those approvals. Broader environmental assessments could help identify suitable areas for development. Marine spatial planning is also needed to manage competing uses of South Africa’s ocean space. These are not bureaucratic footnotes, they determine whether investment arrives before or after the cliff. Above all, South Africa needs coordination. The report calls for a dedicated delivery structure. This could be a new workstream similar to Operation Vulindlela – a government-led initiative designed to modernise the country’s electricity, water, transport and digital communications networks. Or it could be a Rompco-style vehicle that brings the state and private sector together, coordinated by a single gas aggregator. A critical review of the required policy, regulatory, procurement, infrastructure and upstream development activities indicates that decisions must be taken within the next few years to avoid a post-2030 gas supply shortfall. Many of these actions have long development and construction lead times and are highly interdependent. Delays in enabling regulations, permitting processes, LNG procurement, terminal development, or domestic gas projects could significantly affect South Africa’s ability to secure alternative gas supplies before existing supplies decline. Early action is therefore essential to ensure that import infrastructure and domestic production capacity are available in time to support future gas demand and maintain security of supply beyond 2030. The call to action is simple: decide now, procure now, permit now, build now. The cliff will not wait for another master plan. Davies Tsikayi, Lecturer,University of the WitwatersrandThis article is republished fromThe Conversationunder a Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article. Added 23 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowKumba Iron Ore steadies logistics amid maintenance, keeps 2026 guidancePicture: Kumba, Sishen Mine, via LinkedinAfricaPorts & ShipsKumba Iron Ore has reported a marginal dip in production and sales for the first half of 2026, but says improved logistics momentum and proactive rail maintenance underpin confidence in meeting full‑year targets. Chief Executive Mpumi Zikalala noted that despite a 3% fall in output to 17. 7 Mt and a 1% decline in sales to 18. 6 Mt, operational resilience and premium product quality continue to support strong realised prices. Rail and Port OperationsRail performance stabilised in the first half, with fewer derailments and a major 10‑day Transnet maintenance shutdown in May as part of the Ore Corridor Restoration programme. The work included replacing 101 km of rail and lifting speed restrictions on 26 km of the export channel. At Saldanha Bay Port, critical equipment was refurbished and Tippler 3 cold‑commissioned, with throughput expected to improve once commissioning is finalised later this year. Ore railed to Saldanha fell 8% in Q2 to 8. 9 Mt, contributing to a 2% decline in H1 volumes. Despite this, sales volumes of 9. 2 Mt in Q2 were broadly flat against Q1. Production and Sales OutlookSishen Mine: Production rose 3% to 12. 7 Mt, supported by improved plant stability, though waste mining was 5% lower. Full‑year guidance remains ~22 Mt. Kolomela Mine: Waste mining surged 55% to 19. 1 Mt, but production fell 16% to 4. 9 Mt due to stock drawdowns and plant maintenance coinciding with the rail shutdown. Guidance remains ~10 Mt. Kumba’s full‑year forecast is unchanged and in line with expectations, with the full-year 2026 guidance at 180–195 Mt for waste mining and at 31-33 Mt for production. Finished stock stood at 7. 0 Mt at end‑June, positioned to supplement sales during upcoming UHDMS plant tie‑in work at Sishen. Market PositionKumba achieved an average realised FOB export price of US$90/wmt, an 8% premium over the benchmark, reflecting demand for high‑grade ore amid global decarbonisation pressures. Zikalala emphasised safety and operational discipline, highlighting a recordable injury frequency rate improvement to 0. 80 from 1. 18 last year. The report underscores how logistics resilience — rail upgrades, port refurbishments, and stock management — remains central to Kumba’s ability to deliver on guidance despite external pressures from the Middle East conflict and cost volatility. Added 23 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowDP World expands East Coast Gateway as Gulf shipping faces war disruptionsMap of the UAE and Strait of Hormuz, showing position of Jebal Abi and Fujairah. Map: Ian Macky PAT 1. 2 Public Domain Click map to enlargeAfricaPorts & ShipsDP World has struck a landmark 50‑year concession with the Fujairah Ports Authority to develop two new deep‑water terminals on the UAE’s east coast, a move widely seen as a strategic response to the ongoing US–Iran conflict that has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The agreement covers the Al Rugaylat container and multi‑purpose terminal and the Dibba General Cargo terminal, both designed to extend the Jebel Ali ecosystem and reinforce the UAE’s integrated supply chain. Once complete, the facilities will add nearly 2. 5 million TEU of container capacity, 1. 7 million tonnes of general cargo, and 190,000 Car Equivalent Units (CEUs) at Al Rugaylat, alongside 3. 6 million tonnes of general cargo capacity at Dibba. Strategic ContextThe development comes at a time when the Gulf’s traditional shipping lanes are under strain. AI forAfricaPorts & Ships for illustrative purposesThe US–Iran war has curtailed free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, forcing regional and global carriers to seek alternative routes. By positioning new terminals on the Gulf of Oman, outside the chokepoint, DP World and Fujairah are effectively creating a secure east‑coast gateway that can handle the latest generation of Ultra Large Container Vessels without the risks associated with Hormuz transit. Industry analysts note that this eastward expansion is not only about capacity but also about resilience. With Jebel Ali operating at high utilisation, Fujairah offers redundancy and flexibility, ensuring that cargo owners retain access to reliable trade corridors even amid geopolitical volatility. Economic and Regional ImpactFujairah has steadily grown into a global maritime hub, and the new terminals are expected to accelerate investment, employment, and long‑term economic opportunity for the emirate. Once operational, DP World’s total UAE container handling capacity will rise from 19. 4 million TEU to nearly 22 million TEU, while significantly boosting general cargo and Ro‑Ro throughput. The terminals will be fully integrated into DP World’s inland logistics network and Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza), enabling seamless cargo movement between ports, logistics hubs, and end markets. Construction is slated to take 24–30 months, with phased delivery. Leadership Voices“The Al Rugaylat and Dibba terminals will bring world‑class capability and new investment to Fujairah, strengthening its role as a regional gateway,” said Sheikh Saleh Bin Mohamed Al Sharqi, Chairman of Fujairah Ports Authority. Essa Kazim, Chairman of DP World added that the investment “…reflects our confidence in the UAE’s future as a leading trade and logistics hub. ”The expansion underscores how the UAE is quickly adapting to shifting global trade realities. By building capacity outside the Strait of Hormuz, DP World is not only reinforcing its domestic logistics ecosystem but also positioning Fujairah as a critical safeguard for regional and international supply chains in an era of heightened geopolitical risk. Added 23 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowIran is turning into the sort of ‘forever war’ that Donald Trump promised to avoidShips caught up in the Persian Gulf, awaiting a safe reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Picture: IMOBamo Nouri,City St George’s, University of LondonandInderjeet Parmar,City St George’s, University of LondonWhen Donald Trump returned to the White House, he promised to avoid another Middle Eastern “forever war”. After the costly experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, that pledge resonated with an American public weary of prolonged military intervention. For a brief moment, it appeared that this promise might be realised. Thememorandum of understanding (MoU)signed by the US and Iran on June 17 seemed to offer a pathway away from escalating confrontation. Markets stabilised, regional tensions eased and there was cautious optimism that Washington and Tehran had stepped back from the brink. That optimism has proved remarkably but unsurprisingly short-lived. US military strikeshave resumedandIran has retaliatedagainst American and its allies across the Gulf. Iran’s proxy allies, the Houthis, have declared themselves ready to close the Red Sea chokepoint at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which has provided an alternative transit route for some oil exports, particularly from Saudi Arabia. Washington continues to combine military pressure with calls for renewed negotiations. But rather than representing the collapse of an isolated peace initiative, these developments may confirm the reality of grey zone conflict – wherediplomacy manages warrather than ends it. When Americans think of forever wars, Iraq and Afghanistan understandably dominate the discussion. Those conflicts were characterised by invasions, prolonged occupations, attempts at nation-building and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops over many years. Their enormous political, financial and human costs eventually became impossible to sustain. The confrontation with Iran is fundamentally different. It is unlikely to require occupation of territory and no serious or sustained attempt directly to remake the Iranian state. Instead, it is fought through air strikes, cyber operations, sanctions, maritime confrontation, intelligence activity and proxy warfare. Military escalation is followed by diplomacy, diplomacy gives way to renewed confrontation, and each episode is presented as a separate crisis. Viewed collectively, these episodes are better understood as the latest phase of a strategic confrontation that began with the 1979 Iranian Revolution rather than as isolated crises. The conflict has evolved over the years through sanctions, proxy warfare, covert operations and cyber conflict into a more direct military confrontation. The repeated breakdown of de-escalation efforts is often attributed to mistrust or diplomatic failure. Both undoubtedly matter, but they do not fully explain why the MoU has unravelled so quickly. Many of its core provisions have become sources of dispute. Israel has continuedmilitary operations in Lebanon, despite expectations that regional hostilities would subside. Washington initially signalled greater economic flexibility towards Iran, including easing restrictions on oil exports and discussions surrounding Iranian assets. Yetsanctions have subsequently expandedand further economic measures have been introduced. From Tehran’s perspective, these actions represent a breach of the spirit – and, in some cases, the letter – of the agreement. From Washington’s perspective, they are responses to continued Iranian activity that it considers destabilising. The Strait of Hormuz illustrates how quickly ambiguity can become renewed confrontation. Article 5 of the MoU envisaged Iranfacilitating the safe passage of commercial shippingthrough the waterway. Commercial traffic initially increased following the agreement. But disagreement soon emerged after Oman – in coordination with the International Maritime Organization and with US backing – established a temporary maritime corridor closer to the Omani coast. Tehran viewed this as inconsistent with the agreed framework and argued that it undermined Iranian responsibility for administering safe passage. Washington rejected that interpretation, maintaining that additional security measures were necessary to protect international shipping. The competing interpretations rapidly became another source of escalation. The conflict itself has also evolved. What began largely as strikes against military infrastructure has increasingly extended to facilities with direct consequences for civilian life. This has includedenergy infrastructure and desalination plantsthat are essential to freshwater supplies across parts of the Gulf. Transport infrastructure, including bridges, has also been targeted. This has prompted debate among military analysts about whether operational objectives are expanding beyond coercive signalling – using limited military force to pressure or influence an opponent’s behaviour – towards broader military aims. It has also raised questions about whether some attacks could violate international humanitarian law and, depending on the circumstances, amount to war crimes. While the expansion of US strikes in this way does not in itself demonstrate that a US ground offensive is imminent, it reflects a widening conflict whose effects increasingly reach civilian populations. Diplomacy is managing conflict, not resolving itThe deeper problem is that the strategic objectives of main players here remain fundamentally incompatible. The US continues to insist that Iran’s nuclear programme and regional influence must be constrained. Iran regards those same capabilities as essential to its security and deterrence. Israel continues to view a strategically stronger Iran as an unacceptable security threat. These objectives cannot all be achieved simultaneously. As a result, diplomacy struggles – not because negotiators lack skill, but because they are attempting to reconcile goals that remain at odds. The MoU temporarily reduced tensions, but it did not alter the structural realities driving the conflict. This has important implications for how the current crisis should be understood. Much of the debate focuses on whether the latest escalation will produce a wider regional war. That possibility cannot be dismissed. Yet another scenario may be equally, if not more, plausible. The US and Iran are settling into a prolonged cycle of calibrated confrontation that lasts far longer than many currently anticipate. Trump promised to end America’s forever wars. Ironically, his presidency may instead come to symbolise the evolution of a new kind of forever war without a clearly defined beginning or end. The greatest danger may therefore not be another Iraq. It may be the gradual normalisation of an enduring conflict that repeatedly disappears from the headlines, only to return in new forms because the political conditions necessary for genuine peace have yet to emerge. This is a new normal for a US foreign policy establishment that retains militarist mindsets, a massive global military capacity and footprint, and values global primacy in an age of power shifts towards a more multi-polar world. Bamo Nouri, Honorary Research Fellow, Department of International Politics,City St George’s, University of LondonandInderjeet Parmar, Professor in International Politics,City St George’s, University of LondonThis article is republished fromThe Conversationunder a Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article. Added 22 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowSAPICS 2026:Michelle Phillips signals the next phase of Transnet’s recoverySAPICS Legacy to LeadershipTerry HutsonAfricaPorts & ShipsFor much of the past two years, Transnet Group Chief Executive Michelle Phillips has spoken about restoring South Africa’s freight logistics system after years of declining performance. Her public addresses have understandably focused on improving rail volumes, rebuilding confidence in the ports, and returning the state-owned company to operational stability. Michelle Phillips Transnet CEHer keynote address this week at the annual SAPICS Conference in Cape Town, however, suggested that Transnet’s recovery has entered a new phase. While there were no headline-grabbing announcements of major infrastructure projects or new private-sector partnerships, Phillips delivered what may prove to be one of her most significant policy speeches since assuming the leadership of the freight logistics group. The emphasis was noticeably different. Rather than concentrating primarily on trains, ports and cargo volumes, Phillips spoke at length about governance, procurement, accountability and commercial discipline. The message was clear: operational recovery alone will not secure Transnet’s future. Equally important is rebuilding the systems, culture and decision-making processes that underpin the organisation. It is a subtle distinction, but an important one. The first stage of Transnet’s recovery has necessarily involved arresting operational decline. Improving rail performance, increasing export volumes and restoring confidence among customers have been the visible measures of success. The next stage appears to focus on ensuring that the organisation itself is capable of sustaining that recovery. One of the clearest examples came in Phillips’ discussion of procurement reform. For many years, allegations of inflated pricing and irregular procurement have damaged both Transnet’s finances and its reputation. At SAPICS, Phillips described the introduction of catalogue-based pricing systems that automatically compare purchase prices against established market values. Using a deliberately simple illustration, she remarked that if an item worth R1. 50 is entered into the procurement system at R1,500, the transaction will simply not proceed. Behind the simplicity of the example lies a significant change in philosophy. Rather than relying solely on oversight after contracts have been awarded, Transnet is increasingly embedding controls within its procurement systems to prevent excessive pricing before purchases are approved. Phillips also revealed that seven suppliers had been blacklisted during the previous week alone, while disciplinary action against employees continues and further investigations remain under way. The message to suppliers attending the conference was unmistakable. The era in which state-owned enterprises were regarded as customers willing to pay inflated prices simply because they were government entities appears to be drawing to a close. Phillips challenged what she described as the assumption that “government pricing” should differ from market pricing, making it clear that Transnet intends paying fair commercial prices and expects suppliers to compete accordingly. She also questioned the long-established role of intermediaries in the procurement chain, asking why products manufactured overseas should necessarily pass through local middlemen before reaching Transnet. While acknowledging the importance of local industry, she argued that greater emphasis should be placed on developing domestic manufacturing capability rather than rewarding intermediary trading structures. Although procurement dominated much of the address, Phillips did not neglect Transnet’s operational challenges. She acknowledged that Transnet Freight Rail remains approximately 3. 16 million tonnes behind its internal annual target, while expressing confidence that overall freight volumes for the current financial year will nevertheless exceed last year’s total of 167. 9 million tonnes. The admission itself reflected a refreshing degree of transparency. Rather than presenting an overly optimistic picture, Phillips acknowledged that recovery remains a work in progress, albeit one moving in the right direction. Her comments on capital investment were similarly realistic. Transnet’s five-year capital investment programme amounts to approximately R129. 1 billion, but Phillips noted that around R116 billion of this will be devoted to sustaining and restoring existing infrastructure rather than funding major expansion projects. For many observers, this figure illustrates the extent to which years of deferred maintenance continue to shape Transnet’s priorities. Before new capacity can be created, existing assets must first be restored to reliable operating condition. Another statistic highlighted the scale of the challenge facing the organisation beyond engineering and operations. Transnet now spends close to R5 billion annually protecting its infrastructure against cable theft, vandalism and organised criminal activity. That expenditure, substantial in its own right, underlines how closely logistics performance has become linked to national security and law enforcement. Perhaps just as revealing as what Phillips said was what she chose not to say. There were no announcements of major new port concession programmes, no significant expansion projects, no large locomotive procurement initiatives and no revisions to Transnet’s policy on private-sector participation. Instead, the emphasis throughout the address was on building a stronger institution capable of delivering long-term operational performance. Taken together, the speech suggests that Transnet’s recovery strategy is evolving. The initial focus was necessarily on stabilising operations. The second phase has centred on rebuilding freight volumes and improving service reliability. The next chapter, if Phillips’ SAPICS address is any guide, is likely to be defined by institutional reform — strengthening governance, embedding commercial discipline, reforming procurement practices and rebuilding organisational credibility. Those changes may not generate the same headlines as new locomotives or expanded port terminals, but they could ultimately prove every bit as important. South Africa’s logistics recovery depends not only on infrastructure and equipment, but on confidence — confidence among customers, investors, suppliers and employees that Transnet has become a disciplined, accountable and commercially focused organisation capable of sustaining the improvements now beginning to emerge. If Michelle Phillips’ address in Cape Town is an indication of the direction in which the organisation is now travelling, the next stage of Transnet’s recovery may be less about rebuilding its assets than about rebuilding the institution itself. Added 22 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowMiddle East maritime crisis deepens as pressure mounts on both Hormuz and the Red SeaThe Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait (left) as seen from space. Picture courtesy NASA. Click image to enlargeAfricaPorts & ShipsThe maritime security situation across the Middle East has deteriorated sharply following renewed military action in the Gulf and a fresh escalation in the Red Sea, raising concerns that global shipping may once again face severe disruption across two of the world’s most strategically important trade routes. While international attention has remained focused on the Strait of Hormuz following renewed military exchanges between the United States and Iran, and where a merchant ship was set on fire and has been abandoned by her crew, a parallel development in the Red Sea has heightened fears that commercial shipping could once again become caught between two expanding conflict zones. The latest escalation follows announcements by Yemen’s Houthi movement that it has commenced a blockade against Saudi-linked shipping transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway linking the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. According to the Houthis, the blockade doesn’t just involve Saudi-owned or operated ships, but any vessel that has called at a Saudi port will be prevented from navigating the narrow strait that divides the Gulf of Aden from the Red Sea. Although the precise scope of the announcement remains to be tested, shipping companies, insurers and naval forces will be watching closely to determine whether the declaration signals a return to the sustained attacks on merchant vessels that characterised much of 2024 and 2025. The Bab el-Mandeb remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, carrying container traffic between Asia and Europe, together with large volumes of crude oil, refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas. Any renewed disruption could once again force shipping lines to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of nautical miles to voyages, increasing fuel costs and reducing global fleet capacity. It follows recent announcements by several container lines that they will return several of their services to using the Red Sea and Suez Canal route instead of taking the long journey around the Cape. The renewed tension comes as uncertainty persists in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Following recent United States air strikes against Iranian military and nuclear-related facilities, Iran has continued retaliatory attacks involving ballistic missiles and drones directed at US military installations and allied facilities elsewhere in the region. Although the Strait of Hormuz has not been formally closed, the security environment has become increasingly volatile, prompting many shipowners to reassess their exposure to Gulf voyages. Several shipping companies have reportedly reduced the number of vessels entering the Gulf while others have delayed sailings or implemented additional security measures. Marine insurers continue to monitor the situation closely, with war-risk premiums remaining elevated for vessels trading in the region. Together, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb form the maritime gateways connecting the oil and gas-producing Gulf states with Europe, Asia and North America. A significant proportion of the world’s seaborne crude oil exports, liquefied natural gas shipments and containerised trade passes through one or both of these narrow waterways. The simultaneous deterioration in both regions presents the shipping industry with a particularly difficult operating environment. While neither route has been completely closed, the combination of military conflict, missile and drone attacks, uncertainty over freedom of navigation and rising insurance costs is increasing pressure on global supply chains. For African ports, renewed diversions around the Cape of Good Hope could once again generate increased vessel traffic similar to that experienced during earlier Red Sea disruptions. Ports including Cape Town, Ngqura, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Walvis Bay may therefore see additional demand for bunkering, repairs, crew changes and logistics services should carriers increasingly avoid the Suez route. Whether the latest developments evolve into a prolonged maritime crisis will depend largely on political and military decisions taken over the coming days and weeks. For now, however, shipowners, charterers and cargo interests are once again confronting the prospect that two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints could remain under sustained threat at the same time. Although there has been no confirmed resumption of attacks on merchant shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb since the latest Houthi announcement, the warning has already prompted precautionary action by parts of the shipping industry. The rerouting of two Saudi oil tankers demonstrates how rapidly perceived security risks can influence commercial decision-making, even before military action occurs. Added 21 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowTransnet opens Cape Town multipurpose terminal to private operatorsPicture: TNPA with AP&S berth indicators. Click image to enlargeAfricaPorts & Ships…. But Container Terminal Remains AbsentTransnet has taken another step in opening South Africa’s commercial ports to greater private sector participation by inviting interested companies and consortia to bid for the right to redevelop and operate the Multi-Purpose Terminal (MPT, B to D berths) at the Port of Cape Town. The Request for Proposals (RFP), published on the National Treasury eTender Portal on Friday, 17 July, seeks a private terminal operator to design, finance, refurbish, construct where necessary, operate and maintain the facility under a 25-year concession agreement before transferring it back to Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA) at the end of the concession period. The concession covers the port’s multi-purpose terminal, serving a broad range of conventional cargoes including breakbulk, project cargo, steel products, timber, agricultural products and other non-containerised freight. The successful operator will be expected to modernise the facility, improve productivity and invest in equipment and infrastructure over the life of the concession. Full details of the bidding process, eligibility requirements, briefing arrangements and submission deadlines are contained in the RFP documentation available through the government’s eTender Portal and Transnet’s procurement systems. The closing date for applications is Friday, 20 Nov 2026 @ 11:00 – a compulsory Briefing Session will be held on 6 August 2026 @ 10:00. The latest concession follows similar private sector initiatives undertaken by TNPA at Cape Town’s liquid bulk and cold storage terminals as government continues its programme of introducing private investment and expertise into South Africa’s port sector. Cape Town Executive Mayor Geordin Hill-Lewis welcomed the announcement, describing it as an important reform that the city had long advocated. He said opening the terminal to private sector participation would help improve operational performance at the port, strengthen trade and support economic growth in both Cape Town and the wider Western Cape. While the announcement has generally been welcomed by port users, it is also likely to disappoint many in the shipping and logistics industries who had hoped Transnet’s next concession would involve the Cape Town Container Terminal. The container terminal has, in recent years, become synonymous with vessel delays, weather-related disruptions and operational inefficiencies that have periodically affected South Africa’s fruit export season and international shipping schedules. Many industry stakeholders have argued that introducing an experienced international terminal operator at the container facility would deliver the greatest immediate improvement to port performance. For now, however, there is no indication from either TNPA or Transnet as to whether, or when, the Cape Town Container Terminal itself may be offered to private operators under a concession or partnership arrangement. Nevertheless, the decision to seek private investment for the Multi-Purpose Terminal represents another incremental advance in South Africa’s broader port reform programme, one aimed at improving efficiency, attracting investment and restoring the competitiveness of the country’s commercial ports. Added 21 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowKenya revives Standard Gauge Railway expansion towards Uganda after six-year hiatusMap courtesy Ian Macky PAT 1. 2 domain free. Click map to enlargeSpecial Series: Africa’s Future Trade CorridorsTerry HutsonAfricaPorts & ShipsFor more than six years Kenya’s ambitious Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) appeared destined to remain an unfinished transport corridor, ending abruptly at Naivasha after Chinese financing for further construction dried up. Now, in a move that could reshape freight transport across East Africa, construction is resuming on the long-awaited western extension towards the Ugandan border, reviving one of Africa’s largest and most strategically important infrastructure projects. The renewed programme will extend the SGR from Naivasha through Narok, Bomet, Sondu, Ahero, Kisumu, Yala and Mumias before reaching Malaba on the Kenya-Uganda border. Contrary to occasional suggestions that the railway might follow a more direct inland route, Kenya has retained its original alignment via Kisumu, ensuring that the country’s principal port on Lake Victoria becomes an integral part of the regional transport network. The decision restores the original vision of creating a continuous high-capacity freight corridor linking the Port of Mombasa with the economies of Uganda and, ultimately, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. The Standard Gauge Railway first entered service in 2017 when the 472-kilometre Mombasa-Nairobi section opened after being constructed by China Road and Bridge Corporation. Widely regarded as Kenya’s largest infrastructure investment since independence, the railway substantially reduced freight and passenger transit times between East Africa’s busiest seaport and the capital. Two years later the line was extended another 120 kilometres to Naivasha, where an inland container depot was established to encourage greater movement of cargo by rail. The railway was expected to continue west almost immediately. Instead, the project stalled. Kenya Railways standard gauge railway container train to Naivasha. Picture courtesy Kenya RailwaysChina’s Exim Bank, which had financed the earlier phases, became increasingly cautious about funding additional large-scale overseas infrastructure as concerns grew over sovereign debt exposure and the commercial performance of Belt and Road investments. Without fresh financing the railway stopped at Naivasha, prompting critics to describe it as “a railway to nowhere. ”Kenya’s government has now revived the project using a markedly different financial model. Rather than depending entirely on another major sovereign loan, the extension will be supported largely through revenue generated by Kenya’s Railway Development Levy, a dedicated charge on imported goods that provides an ongoing domestic funding source. China remains closely involved through China Road and Bridge Corporation, although its role now reflects the changing nature of Chinese participation in overseas infrastructure projects, with greater emphasis on engineering partnerships than large-scale state lending. The Naivasha-Kisumu section will cover approximately 260 kilometres, followed by the final stage from Kisumu to Malaba, bringing the railway to Uganda’s frontier. Current estimates place the total cost of the extension at approximately US$5 billion, although final costs will depend on the scope of works and financing arrangements. Construction is expected to continue through 2027, with completion targeted during the second half of the year, subject to land acquisition, funding and construction progress. For Kenya, the railway promises to reduce transport costs, increase the competitiveness of the Port of Mombasa and strengthen links with neighbouring economies. For Uganda, it represents a major step towards faster and more reliable access to international markets through Mombasa while complementing Kampala’s own plans to construct a matching standard gauge railway network. Beyond the two countries, the project forms part of the Northern Corridor, potentially benefiting Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo by providing a more efficient freight route between the Indian Ocean and the interior of Africa. More than simply extending a railway, Kenya’s decision marks the revival of a regional transport vision that has remained incomplete for almost a decade. Added 20 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowThe railway that could reshape East African tradeKenya Railways SGR container train Picture: Kenya RailwaysSpecial Series: Africa’s Future Trade CorridorsTerry HutsonAfricaPorts & ShipsWhen Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway first reached Naivasha in 2019, many observers questioned why billions of dollars had been spent on a railway that stopped hundreds of kilometres short of its intended destination. Seven years later that question is finally receiving an answer. The resumption of construction towards Kisumu and Malaba is far more than another railway project. It has the potential to alter the competitive balance between East Africa’s ports, redefine inland freight logistics and accelerate economic integration across the East African Community. For the Port of Mombasa the implications are profound. For decades Mombasa has served as the principal maritime gateway for much of East and Central Africa, handling cargo destined not only for Kenya but also Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. Its greatest competitive advantage has always been geography. Its greatest weakness has been the cost and reliability of moving cargo inland. Every improvement in rail efficiency strengthens Mombasa’s ability to retain that geographic advantage. Completion of the SGR to Malaba would provide a continuous modern rail corridor from the Indian Ocean to Uganda’s border, significantly reducing dependence on long-distance road transport while improving predictability for shippers. Perhaps equally important is the decision to route the railway through Kisumu. Rather than merely serving as an intermediate station, Kisumu becomes an intermodal logistics hub where rail freight can transfer directly onto vessels operating across Lake Victoria. That creates new opportunities for lake transport serving Port Bell near Kampala, Jinja, Mwanza in Tanzania and other regional ports, reviving a transport system whose strategic importance has often been overlooked in recent decades. The result is not simply another railway. It is the creation of a genuinely integrated transport corridor combining deep-sea shipping, rail and inland water transport. For Uganda the benefits extend well beyond lower transport costs. A more efficient connection to Mombasa enhances export competitiveness while improving the security and resilience of supply chains for imported fuel, manufactured goods and industrial equipment. Uganda is simultaneously advancing plans for its own Standard Gauge Railway network, raising the prospect that standard gauge rail could eventually extend well beyond Kampala. The implications also extend southward. Dar es Salaam has invested heavily in its own Standard Gauge Railway linking Tanzania with the interior. Tanzania railway map. The planned SGR route is from Dar es Salaam inland to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika and to Mwanza on Lake Victoria. The light orange line is the Cape gauge TAZARA line to Zambia. Other lines are metre gaugeAs both countries develop modern rail systems, competition between the Northern Corridor through Mombasa and the Central Corridor through Dar es Salaam is likely to intensify. Rather than competing solely on port efficiency, both gateways will increasingly compete on the performance of their entire logistics corridors. For shipping lines this is welcome news. Lower inland transport costs, greater reliability and shorter cargo dwell times improve the attractiveness of East African ports for regional distribution. For cargo owners, the principal beneficiaries should be lower logistics costs and improved service reliability. There is another lesson emerging from Kenya’s decision. The financing model may prove almost as significant as the railway itself. The era in which African governments relied almost exclusively on large sovereign infrastructure loans from China appears to be giving way to more diversified funding structures involving domestic revenue streams, public-private partnerships and risk-sharing arrangements. If successful, Kenya’s approach could provide a template for future transport infrastructure across the continent. The Standard Gauge Railway has often been described as one of Africa’s most ambitious transport investments. Until now it has also been one of its most incomplete. The resumption of construction towards Malaba suggests that East Africa’s railway revolution may simply have paused rather than ended. Added 20 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦News continues belowRailways:Should Africa build for today’s freight — or tomorrow’s economy?200-wagon coal train headed along the dedicated coal line towards the port at Richards Bay. Picture by Keith Betts. Click image to enlargeSpecial Series: Africa’s Future Trade CorridorsTerry HutsonAfricaPorts & ShipsThe renewed construction of Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway from Naivasha to Malaba, together with Tanzania’s continuing investment in its own Standard Gauge Railway network, raises an important question that extends far beyond East Africa. When should a country build a railway?Should governments wait until sufficient freight volumes are guaranteed to justify the investment? Or should they build strategic transport infrastructure first, in the expectation that economic growth, industrial development and trade will follow?The answer to that question is shaping the future of Africa’s transport corridors. For decades South Africa has approached railway investment largely from a commercial perspective. New infrastructure has generally been expected to demonstrate strong projected freight volumes, committed customers and acceptable financial returns before construction proceeds. That philosophy has produced some of the world’s finest heavy-haul railways. The Richards Bay Coal Line and the Sishen–Saldanha iron ore corridor remain global benchmarks for bulk freight efficiency. Yet the same philosophy may also make it more difficult to develop entirely new corridors where today’s traffic is insufficient but tomorrow’s economic potential could be substantial. East Africa appears to be taking a different approach. Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway was criticised from the outset by those who questioned whether existing freight volumes justified the investment. Tanzania has faced similar criticism while committing billions of dollars to its own expanding SGR network. Neither government has argued that current traffic alone provides the justification. Instead, both have presented railways as strategic national infrastructure designed to stimulate economic growth, encourage industrial investment, strengthen regional trade and enhance the competitiveness of their ports. And they’ve based their decisions on numbers that are substantially lower than those expected further south. The distinction is subtle but significant. One model asks what freight already exists. The other asks what freight could exist if the infrastructure were available. History suggests there is merit in both approaches. The United States transcontinental railways, Canada’s national rail system and Australia’s inland freight corridors all opened vast regions to economic development rather than merely responding to established demand. More recently, China has frequently built transport infrastructure ahead of demand as part of a broader strategy of regional development. Africa now appears to be confronting the same question. South Africa offers an instructive case study. The country’s world-class heavy-haul railways have long underpinned major export industries. However, debates surrounding future investment have become increasingly influenced by changing environmental priorities and the global transition toward lower-carbon energy. While many developed economies are reducing coal consumption, international demand has by no means disappeared. India and China continue to import significant quantities, while several developing economies remain dependent on coal-fired electricity generation. In this environment, limiting rail investment does not necessarily eliminate freight demand. Instead, it may divert increasing volumes onto the national road network, creating higher road maintenance costs, greater congestion, increased accident risks and potentially higher transport emissions than would have resulted from efficient rail operations. The same strategic considerations arise in Botswana. For many years proposals have been advanced to extend rail connections capable of serving Botswana’s coalfields through South Africa. Progress has been limited, encouraging renewed interest in lengthy western export routes through Namibia and the Port of Walvis Bay. From Botswana’s perspective, the objective is not simply finding another railway. It is securing reliable, long-term access to global markets. For Namibia, the opportunity extends well beyond coal exports. A modern rail corridor could strengthen Walvis Bay’s role as a gateway for copper, manganese, agricultural products, containers and general cargo serving Botswana, Zambia and parts of Central Africa. Infrastructure decisions made today may therefore determine trade patterns for generations. Perhaps the most valuable lesson emerging from East Africa is not that one model is superior to another. Rather, it is that railway investment can be assessed through more than one lens. A commercially successful railway is clearly desirable. But a strategically successful railway may also generate wider economic benefits that extend beyond the railway itself — creating new industries, attracting investment, strengthening ports and lowering national logistics costs. Those wider benefits are difficult to capture in a conventional financial appraisal, yet they may ultimately prove to be the greatest return on the investment. As Kenya and Tanzania push ahead with ambitious railway expansion, Southern Africa may increasingly find itself asking whether transport infrastructure should simply respond to economic growth — or whether, in some circumstances, it should help create it. Added 20 July 2026♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦

Source: africaports.co.za