Bulgaria Under Scrutiny Over Spy Tech Exports to Rights-Abusing Regimes - Novinite. com - EUROPE SAYS
Human Rights Watch has accused Bulgarian authorities of approving exports of surveillance technologies to countries with documented human rights concerns, raising new questions about the effectiveness of EU. . .
Human Rights Watch has accused Bulgarian authorities of approving exports of surveillance technologies to countries with documented human rights concerns, raising new questions about the effectiveness of EU export controls on dual-use equipment. The claims are based on an analysis published by HRW, which reviewed licensing data from Bulgaria’s Interagency Commission for Export Control and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. According to the report, between 2018 and 2023, the commission approved export licenses for products linked to the surveillance company Circles, which is currently based in Bulgaria. The approved exports reportedly included telecommunications interception systems, mobile communications monitoring tools, and other forms of surveillance software. The listed destinations include Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Serbia, and the United Arab Emirates. The end users ranged from intelligence and military agencies to police forces, government bodies, and private entities. HRW emphasized that the licensing records confirm authorization rather than final delivery of equipment. However, the organization argues that the issuance of such permits itself raises concerns about risk assessment standards under EU law. One HRW researcher said, “All governments in the EU should restrict the export of tools that can be used for repression, not automatically approve them,” adding that existing oversight mechanisms appear insufficient in preventing sensitive technologies from reaching high-risk environments. The report notes that Circles originated in Cyprus before relocating operations to Bulgaria. It is linked to Tal Dilian, also associated with Intellexa, a company connected to spyware tools previously investigated in Europe. Dilian has been sanctioned by the United States over his involvement in the development and distribution of surveillance technologies and was previously convicted in Greece in a case involving spyware use against journalists and political figures, a decision he has appealed. HRW also highlights that some Circles systems reportedly exploit vulnerabilities in global telecom infrastructure, including SS7 weaknesses, enabling interception of communications and tracking of mobile users. Additional licensing records referenced cooperation with Israeli firms such as Q Cyber Technologies and NSO Group, both previously linked to advanced spyware tools. The exported technologies allegedly include systems capable of tracking mobile location data, intercepting calls, altering IP-related identifiers, and capturing communications traffic through IMSI catcher devices. These tools can reportedly allow authorities to monitor calls, messages, and internet activity, as well as track user movement through mobile networks. According to HRW, many recipient countries have histories of surveillance and restrictions on civil liberties. The United Arab Emirates is cited as maintaining strict limits on public criticism, supported by extensive monitoring infrastructure. Azerbaijan is described as having a pattern of detentions and pressure on journalists and activists. Similar concerns are raised regarding Bahrain, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Morocco, Serbia, Israel, and Jordan, where surveillance tools have allegedly been used against media and civil society actors. The organization said it verified the licensing documents through metadata analysis and cross-checking with official records obtained from Bulgaria’s Ministry of Economy and Industry under public information requests. In response, Bulgarian authorities stated that exports violating national or EU commitments, including human rights obligations, are not permitted and that all applications undergo review. The ministry also reiterated a policy of “zero tolerance” for misuse and stressed that licensing decisions are made in accordance with established procedures, including assessment of end-user documentation and official information sources. The European Commission, for its part, noted that export licensing decisions for dual-use technologies fall under the jurisdiction of individual member states, meaning responsibility rests primarily at national level. HRW rejected this position, with researcher Zach Campbell arguing that “the Bulgarian government and the European Commission have a clear responsibility and legal mandate to control these exports, but they fail to do so,” claiming that surveillance technologies continue to be approved without adequate human rights safeguards. The report further cites specific transactions, including Azerbaijani intelligence purchases of server infrastructure and mobile tracking systems worth tens of thousands of dollars, as well as Serbian Interior Ministry acquisitions of mobile surveillance devices shortly before national elections. Additional examples include systems sold to agencies in the UAE, Malaysia, Bahrain, and other countries, covering tools used for mobile interception and location tracking. Some exports reportedly passed through Sofia Airport, while others involved intermediary companies linked to Israel-based surveillance firms. HRW also points to business ties between Circles and NSO Group, including documented purchases of Circles technology by NSO Group itself, later transferred to Israeli defense structures. The report stresses that Circles is not currently listed under US sanctions, although NSO Group has been added to US export control lists due to concerns over misuse of spyware against civil society and political figures. The findings come ahead of a planned European Commission review of the EU dual-use export control framework, expected in 2027. HRW argues that current regulations are insufficient to prevent surveillance tools developed or exported within the EU from being used in contexts involving repression or serious rights violations. Under EU rules, national authorities are required to assess whether exported cyber-surveillance tools could be used for internal repression or human rights abuses. However, HRW notes that modern surveillance systems often combine commercially available hardware and advanced software, complicating classification and enforcement across member states. Source:HRW