From Hormuz to Mecca: Is the Middle East moving beyond a US-centric security order?
Editor's note: Emre Diner is a Turkish journalist and foreign policy analyst specialising in the Middle East, energy geopolitics, and international security. This article reflects the author's personal views. . .
Editor's note: Emre Diner is a Turkish journalist and foreign policy analyst specialising in the Middle East, energy geopolitics, and international security. This article reflects the author's personal views and does not necessarily represent those of News. Az. The Middle East is entering a period in which its security architecture is becoming increasingly difficult to explain solely through the traditional framework of American primacy. The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic consequences of the US-Iran war and theMecca Joint Defence Agreementbetween Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may appear to be separate developments. Yet taken together, they point to a broader transformation in the regional balance of power. The central question is no longer simply whether the United States is withdrawing from the Middle East. Washington retains extensive military capabilities, partnerships and political influence across the region, making any imminent American departure unlikely. The more consequential question is whether regional states are gradually moving away from a system in which Washington is expected to provide the principal security guarantee towards a multi-layered architecture in which they assume greater responsibility for their own defence. TheStrait of Hormuzoffers perhaps the clearest illustration of why this debate has intensified. Before the war, roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG trade passed through this strategic waterway. Recent disruptions have again demonstrated how quickly instability there can affect international energy markets and maritime trade. According to available figures, only five commodity vessels passed through Hormuz on 15 August, while no passage was recorded on 16 August. The previous weekend had seen 31 vessels transit the Strait, compared with more than 130 vessel movements per day before the war. Source: PoliticoThese figures transform the Hormuz question from a confrontation between Washington and Tehran into a much wider strategic issue: who can guarantee the security of one of the world's most important energy corridors?For decades, the answer was largely the United States. American naval power, military deployments and bilateral security arrangements with Gulf states formed the backbone of the regional security architecture. The latest crisis, however, has exposed the limits of that arrangement. Even with substantial American military capabilities deployed across the region, instability surrounding Hormuz has continued to generate economic and security consequences. This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it demonstrates that military superiority alone cannot guarantee uninterrupted regional stability. Against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on 7 August acquires broader geopolitical significance. The provision that an armed attack against one party would be regarded as an attack against all three gives the agreement significant strategic weight. At the same time, the full scope of the parties’ military commitments has yet to be publicly detailed, meaning that comparisons with established collective-defence organisations should be treated with caution. Its significance instead lies in the combination of three complementary sources of power. Türkiye contributes an increasingly sophisticated defence-industrial base, extensive operational experience, advanced unmanned systems, missile technology, naval platforms and electronic warfare capabilities. Pakistan brings a large and experienced military establishment, strategic capabilities and a geographical position linking South Asia with the Gulf. Saudi Arabia adds substantial economic resources, a central role in global energy markets and considerable political influence across the Arab world. The potential strength of the arrangement therefore lies not in the three countries possessing identical capabilities, but in their ability to combine complementary strengths. This inevitably raises the question: does the agreement mark the beginning of an alternative to the US-led security architecture?For now, however, there is insufficient evidence to describe the agreement as an anti-American bloc. US President Donald Trump’s public support for the agreement is particularly significant in this respect. His positive reaction suggests that Washington may view stronger regional defence cooperation not necessarily as a challenge to American influence, but potentially as part of a broader burden-sharing model. The emerging concept may therefore be better described as controlled strategic autonomy. Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have strong incentives to ensure that their security does not depend exclusively on decisions taken in Washington. Expanding indigenous defence production, interoperability, military coordination and deterrence capabilities gives them greater freedom of action. Yet greater strategic autonomy does not necessarily mean abandoning existing alliances. Rather than replacing the American security architecture, arrangements such as the Mecca Agreement could add another regional layer to it. This distinction could become one of the defining characteristics of the Middle East’s emerging security order. The key question may therefore shift from whether the United States will remain in the Middle East to whether Washington will continue to enjoy the same degree of security primacy that it has exercised in previous decades. The concept of burden-sharing helps explain why Washington might be willing to accept such a transformation. Successive US administrations have encouraged allies and partners to assume greater responsibility for their own defence. Washington seeks to preserve its influence and strategic access while reducing the political, financial and military costs associated with serving as the region’s principal security provider. Source: raksha-anirveda. comUnder such conditions, stronger defence cooperation among US partners does not necessarily undermine Washington’s strategy. If carefully managed, it could instead complement it. This is also where the connection between Hormuz and the Mecca Agreement becomes particularly significant. The Hormuz crisis demonstrates the practical limits of external security guarantees, while the Mecca Agreement reflects an effort by regional powers to develop greater capacity to safeguard their own security. One exposes a vulnerability; the other offers a potential institutional response. For Saudi Arabia, the security of Gulf shipping lanes is inseparable from its national economic security. For Türkiye, instability in the Gulf affects energy prices, trade routes and the wider regional balance. Pakistan likewise has significant economic, security and strategic interests in Gulf stability. The security calculations of the three states are therefore becoming increasingly interconnected. What is emerging should nevertheless not be described as a “post-American Middle East”. Such a conclusion would underestimate both the scale of the US military presence and the depth of Washington’s relationships with regional states. A more convincing description would be a Middle East that is becoming less exclusively dependent on the United States. The region’s major powers are increasingly pursuing relationships with several strategic centres simultaneously. Pakistan can maintain its close relationship with China while engaging with Washington and deepening defence cooperation with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh can preserve its security partnership with the United States while strengthening economic ties with China and developing additional regional military mechanisms. Türkiye can remain a NATO member while building independent strategic networks across the Gulf and South Asia. This is not traditional bloc politics. It is a form of multidimensional strategic balancing. The implications could extend well beyond the three signatories of the Mecca Agreement. If the mechanism evolves from political commitments into institutionalised military cooperation, its significance will depend on several questions that remain unanswered: whether joint command structures will emerge, whether intelligence-sharing will expand, whether defence-industrial cooperation will become more integrated, and whether additional states will eventually join. These factors will determine whether the Mecca Agreement becomes a durable pillar of regional security or remains primarily a political declaration of strategic intent. The wider trajectory, however, is becoming clearer. The Hormuz crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of regional energy security. The US-Iran confrontation has intensified questions about the limits of external security guarantees. The Mecca Agreement, meanwhile, demonstrates that key regional actors are increasingly willing to develop their own deterrence mechanisms. The resulting transformation is therefore better understood not as an American withdrawal, but as a gradual erosion of the United States’ exclusive role as the region’s principal security provider. Washington will almost certainly remain the most powerful external military actor in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. What may change, however, is the assumption that regional security must necessarily be organised around American capabilities alone. The future could instead feature overlapping security arrangements: American partnerships, regional defence agreements, bilateral military cooperation, indigenous defence industries and increasingly autonomous diplomatic mechanisms operating alongside one another. From that perspective, the Mecca Agreement should be seen less as the culmination of a new regional order than as an early indication of what that order could become. The fundamental geopolitical question is therefore no longer simply whether the United States will withdraw from the Middle East, but how the region’s security architecture will evolve as regional powers assume greater responsibility for their own defence. The American presence may endure, but the United States’ security primacy may not. 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