Korean Peninsula Update, July 14, 2026 - EUROPE SAYS
Data Cutoff: July 13, 2026The Korean Peninsula Update is a joint product of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). It supports the AEI–ISW Coalition Defense of. . .
Data Cutoff: July 13, 2026The Korean Peninsula Update is a joint product of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). It supports the AEI–ISW Coalition Defense of Taiwan project’s broader mission to strengthen a de facto coalition to deter and contain China and North Korea in the Indo-Pacific. This update tracks and analyzes political, military, and security developments on the Korean Peninsula—centered on the North Korean threat and evolving dynamics on the peninsula, South Korean responses, and broader US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. ToplinesUkrainian military intelligence (HUR) confirmed North Korea’s role in providing Russia with artillery for the war in Ukraine, including an estimated 25-40 percent of current Russian artillery ammunition. North Korea has supplied more than 600 artillery systems of different types and calibers to Russia, including M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled guns, M-1991 240mm multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), 107mm Type 63 rocket launchers, self-propelled anti-tank missile systems, D-74 122mm towed guns, and Type 76 140mm mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, and artillery shells. [1] North Korea has also provided more than 100 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia, which has used at least 80 of these missiles. [2]HUR frames these weapons deliveries as “systemic” in their scale and regularity, with North Korea occupying a “key position” among Russia’s foreign weapons and equipment suppliers. [3] North Korean weapons provisions to Russia reportedly totaled over 9 million 12mm and 152mm artillery rounds by the end of 2024, 12 million 152mm artillery shells by July 2025, and an estimated 15 million 152mm artillery shells by March 2026. [4] Russia’s reliance on North Korean artillery munitions is increasing as of July 2025, with six Russian artillery units sourcing 50 to 100 percent of their munitions from North Korea. [5] The latest HUR reports do not clearly represent an increase in North Korean weapons provisions, however. HUR estimates that North Korea can produce 1 to 2 million artillery shells per year and could supply a “significant portion” of the shells to Russia depending on North Korea’s political decision-making. [6] North Korea has reaped significant economic benefit from these arms sales, despite international sanctions, with its economy estimated to have grown 3. 7 percent in 2024, a trend likely to continue. [7]South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is continuing to expand South Korea’s cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and taking a role in the global defense industry. North Korea blames South Korea, Japan, the United States, and NATO for weaponizing nuclear capabilities, which North Korea views as essential to its defense. Lee stated at the July 7 NATO summit that South Korea and NATO must evolve their relationship into the “Korea-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2. 0,” which would include joint defense research, production, and operational capabilities. [8] South Korean National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac announced that Seoul and NATO had initiated negotiations to establish a baseline procurement agreement following Lee’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that same day. [9] Wi clarified that this agreement will not impact South Korea’s relationship with either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia, however. [10] Lee also discussed military shipbuilding with US President Donald Trump. [11] Lee revealed on June 19 that Trump inquired about South Korea constructing 10 US naval vessels at the G7 Summit in June. [12] Seoul and Washington agreed to expand shipbuilding cooperation during bilateral tariff negotiations in 2025, and the Lee administration and South Korean shipbuilding companies are reportedly preparing a $150 billion fund dedicated to such cooperation with the United States. [13] The US Department of Defense and the US Navy recently issued Requests for Information (RFI) on manufacturing capabilities to three major South Korean shipbuilders, including Hanwha Ocean, which purchased the Philadelphia Shipyard. [14]The Lee administration’s pragmatic approach seeks to increase South Korea’s defense relations with NATO and the United States through deep defense integration, unlike the previous South Korean progressive administration, which limited discussions with NATO primarily to the North Korean nuclear issue. [15] Lee is demonstrating a strong willingness to assume an expansive role in security deterrence to broaden South Korea’s role in global defense and secure substantial economic benefits by promoting the South Korean defense industry. The Lee administration is likely expanding South Korea’s defense industrial base to align with its core tenet of self-reliant defense. [16] Seoul is also negotiating with Washington to pursue greater self-reliance by transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) and acquiring nuclear-powered submarines during Lee’s presidential term. [17]North Korea condemned the growing cooperation between South Korea and NATO, alongside the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral denuclearization coordination, as an attempt to “slander” Pyongyang’s sovereign rights to nuclear power. [18] An unnamed North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson criticized the trilateral reaffirmation of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on July 11, counter-arguing that the United States, South Korea, Japan, and NATO must preemptively denuclearize given their ongoing military buildups. [19] The spokesperson also warned the NATO members not to export geopolitical instability in Europe caused by NATO into the Asia-Pacific region. [20]Key TakeawaysNorth Korean Military Sales to Russia: Ukrainian intelligence confirmed that North Korea is contributing a significant amount of artillery to Russia for the war in Ukraine. North Korea has supplied Russia with hundreds of artillery systems and currently provides an estimated 25 to 40 percent of Russian artillery ammunition. South Korea-NATO Relations: South Korea is working to expand its relations with NATO member states and enhance its role in the global defense industry. These efforts are continuing despite North Korea’s condemnations of South Korea-NATO relations and calls for denuclearization. North Korean Domestic PoliticsWorkers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un increased the number of his public appearances in the first half of 2026 compared to this period in 2025 to underscore his prioritization of North Korean military development and domestic affairs. Kim appeared in a total of 92 public activities from January to June 2026, according to a South Korean state-run think tank, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). [21] Kim appeared in 30 military-related activities, which marked his highest number of appearances in the first half of the year since his 2012 inauguration. [22] Kim inspected naval developments, including the commissioning of Choe Hyon and Kang Kon destroyers, multiple missile test launches, and munitions factories. Kim’s public appearances in 2026 nearly doubled his 50 public appearances during the same period in 2025; the highest output since 2014. [23] Kim also attended 19 public events focused on domestic management and civil affairs so far in 2026, the highest first-half total since he took power. [24] ISW-CDOT previously assessed that Kim’s increased appearances at domestic public events in 2025 (31 appearances) were intended to showcase achievements in the economic and civil sectors ahead of the Ninth WPK Party Congress in February 2026. [25] Kim’s high volume of public activities indicates that he is continuing to focus on domestic governance following the Party Congress. Kim’s frequent military-related activities likely indicate that Pyongyang is prioritizing strategic military modernization more than ever before. Kim Jong Un’s daughter, believed to be named Kim Ju Ae, concurrently made 19 public appearances in the first half of 2026, surpassing her total of 17 appearances for the entirety of 2025. [26] Kim Ju Ae accompanied her father to 11 military events during this period. [27] Kim Ju Ae is Kim Jong Un’s likely successor, and her growing public profile may indicate Pyongyang’s efforts to stabilize the succession process. North Korean Military DevelopmentsSee toplines. North Korean Foreign RelationsSatellite imagery shows that the PRC resumed covert shipments of supplies to North Korea, possibly indicating deepening bilateral economic ties. Satellite imagery from Planet Labs revealed likely smuggling at sites near the Yalu River, a river on the PRC-North Korea border. The sites’ proximity to a major highway project suggests the PRC likely knew of and approved the smuggling. [28] South Korean media outlet NK Pro reported on activity at 13 points and the “apparent cargo” seen at five sites between June 19 and 24 and at another five sites between June 28 and 29. [29] Satellite imagery similarly revealed activity at a cargo depot in Samsu County, North Korea, and at a nearby train station. [30]North Korea has made efforts to deepen its ties with the PRC in recent months, likely to gain foreign currency and bolster North Korea’s struggling economy. The transfer of supplies took place following meetings between WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping in June, Xi’s first visit to North Korea in seven years. [31] North Korea likely aims to balance its relationship with the PRC against its relationship with Russia, increasing its own material gains while avoiding dependency on the PRC. North Korean Premier Pak Thae Song met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in Beijing on June 10 ahead of the 65th anniversary of the PRC-North Korea friendship treaty. Pak’s visit one month after Xi’s visit to North Korea indicates a significant improvement in PRC-North Korea relations over the past year. Pak praised the bilateral relationship for jointly advancing the socialist cause and claimed that North Korea and the PRC have worked together to safeguard regional and global peace. [32] Pak also said Xi’s meeting with WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un on June 8 and 9 marked a “new milestone” in the development of North Korea-PRC relations. A PRC readout reported that Pak said that North Korea would support the PRC’s “core interests on issues such as Taiwan,” promote PRC-North Korea unity, and advance the socialist cause. [33] Xi described the 1961 PRC-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance as an important political and legal foundation for “consolidating the combat friendship forged in blood,” referring to PRC intervention to help North Korea in the Korean War, and stated that his June summit with WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un had provided “strategic guidance” for developing bilateral ties. [34] Xi called for the two countries to advance strategic coordination and “create a favorable external environment for both countries to follow a socialist path suited to their own national conditions. ”[35] Pak also met with PRC National People’s Congress Chairman Zhao Leji on July 10 and PRC Premier Li Qiang on July 11. [36] This is the first visit by a North Korean Premier to the PRC since 2018. [37]PRC and North Korean state media announced days after Pak’s departure that Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Wang Huning, the PRC’s fourth-ranking official and top ideologue, will make a “goodwill visit” to North Korea from July 15 through 17. [38]Pak’s visit to the PRC and Wang’s upcoming visit to North Korea are the second and third major PRC-North Korea state visits in 2026, after the Xi-Kim summit on June 8 and 9. [39] Xi and Kim also met at the PRC military parade in September 2025, along with Russian President Vladimir Putin and many other world leaders. [40] The meetings indicate a significant improvement in PRC-North Korean relations following a tense period in 2024, when they held just one high-level meeting, despite the year being designated a “China-North Korea friendship year. ”[41] The relationship declined in 2024, likely in part due to a PRC trilateral joint statement with Japan and South Korea in May 2024 that discussed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, an issue that Pyongyang considers to be non-negotiable. [42] The PRC may also have been displeased with North Korea signing a defense treaty with Russia in June 2024 and its subsequent deployment of troops to aid Russia’s war in Ukraine, which reduced Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang. PRC-North Korea exchanges, including trade, also sharply dropped to nearly zero during the COVID-19 pandemic, but have since mostly recovered. [43] The PRC has also tactically shifted its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program by not publicly mentioning the issue since May 2024, despite stating when asked that its position remains unchanged. [44] The PRC is North Korea’s main economic lifeline and appears to be taking a more tolerant, if not outright cooperative, approach to enable North Korea’s military modernization and diplomatic ambitions. A Ural-based Russian business delegation’s visit to North Korea may spur Russia-North Korea exchanges in mining and resource extraction. The Ural Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which organized the delegation, reported that North Korea was considering cooperation with “Vector,” a company that supplies liquefied natural gas. [45] NK News additionally speculated that the Russian-based Mine Rescue Technologies Scientific and Production Center Joint-Stock Company may have discussed uranium and oil extraction, as well as geologist training, with representatives from the “Sonchon Mine” in North Korea, given their shared specialty. [46] The exact mine the Russian translation refers to is unknown but could be located in Sonchon County, which is suspected of producing uranium ore and gold, or Songchon County, which produces weapons. [47] The Ural Chamber of Commerce and Industry organized the trip to develop business relations among the participants. [48] The exact list of North Korean and Russian representatives is not disclosed, but it includes several North Korean mining, engineering, architecture, and machinery companies. [49] Russian agricultural firm Rusagro also plans to ship 25 tons of pork to North Korea. [50] It is unclear whether the shipment was fulfilled. [51]These relations could lead to expanded trade relations between Russia and North Korea in energy and mining. North Korea has sought further cooperation with Russia on energy for several years now, with the goals of securing additional energy supplies and seeking help with modernizing North Korea’s energy infrastructure. [52] North Korea could also be seeking to strengthen its economy or bolster its defense industry by further developing its mining sector. [53]North Korean Cognitive WarfareNothing significant to report. Inter-Korean RelationsThe South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) is continuing to refer to North Korea as “Joseon,” the term North Koreans use to refer to their country internally, to demonstrate mutual respect and encourage peaceful coexistence, despite North Korea’s continued disinterest in dialogue. The South Korean Council of Senior Religious Leaders stated on July 2 that Seoul should refer to North Korea by its official title, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and its preferred domestic name, “Joseon. ”[54] The Council argued that this change would foster mutual respect and peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. [55] MOU Deputy Spokesperson Jang Yoon-jung evaluated the Council’s statement on July 3, saying that the Council’s remarks represent an ongoing process of building public consensus regarding the potential change in how South Korea officially addresses North Korea. [56] South Korean state-run think tank, KINU, also argued on July 8 that Seoul ultimately needs to consider changing its official terminology for North Korea to ease the current inter-Korean hostilities, while adding that it would be a long-term, gradual process. [57] South Korea currently officially refers to North Korea as “Bukhan [북한],” whereas North Korea calls itself “Joseon [조선]. ” North Korea referred to South Korea as “South Joseon” until WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un declared his hostile two-state relations policy in 2023 and started calling South Korea by its official title, the Republic of Korea. [58] North Korea’s linguistic shift aimed to sever bilateral inter-Korean ties permanently and characterize South Korea as a hostile adversary rather than a potential dialogue partner. The MOU is likely to attempt to accelerate domestic efforts to alter this terminology to improve inter-Korean relations as part of its broad peaceful coexistence policy. The MOU may aim to demonstrate Seoul’s reciprocal posture and build mutual trust to resume dialogue by calling on the South Korean public to adopt this shift in language. MOU Minister Chung Dong-young became the first high-ranking South Korean official to refer to North Korea as the DPRK at a public event in March, along with characterizing inter-Korean relations as “Korea-Joseon relations [한조관계]. ”[59] Chung has consistently maintained his use of this terminology during subsequent international events. [60] ISW-CDOT previously assessed that the MOU’s shift in terminology constitutes a declaration that it remains committed to taking unilateral measures for “peaceful coexistence” with Pyongyang, despite Pyongyang’s continued refusal to engage in inter-Korean dialogue or exchanges. [61]South Korean Domestic PoliticsNothing significant to report. Counter-North Korean Coalition Building EffortsThe Foreign Ministers of South Korea, Japan, and the United States met on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Turkey on July 7 to discuss security and economic cooperation and signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on Small Modular Reactor (SMR) cooperation. [62] South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi pledged to strengthen communication and trilateral cooperation. The readout reiterated their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in line with recent statements and historical precedent. [63] The readout also condemned North Korean cybercrimes and IT worker employment fraud, as well as highlighting the importance of peace and stability around the Taiwan Strait. The memorandum on SMRs aimed to diversify South Korea’s and Japan’s energy imports by using energy from the United States and is for civil nuclear energy purposes, according to the US readout. [64]The Lee administration has sustained US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation despite Lee previously criticizing then-South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s conciliatory approach toward Japan in 2023. [65] Lee characterizes his diplomatic approach as “pragmatism” and has characterized South Korea’s relationship with Japan as “inseparable” due to their geographic proximity. [66] Lee is balancing the trilateral relationship with efforts to renew relations with the PRC, priorities that are often at odds. Lee formally reaffirmed South Korea’s commitment to respecting the “one-China” policy ahead of his meeting with PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping in January. [67]South Korea is strengthening its relations with Ukraine to receive North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) and enhance South Korean defense against the Russia-North Korea threat. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung discussed South Korean humanitarian aid to Ukraine, North Korean POWs, and South Korea-Ukraine relations with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on July 8 at the NATO Summit in Turkey. [68] South Korea pledged to donate $100 million (151. 5 billion South Korean Won) in humanitarian aid to Ukraine for its war against Russia. South Korean Director of National Security Wi Sung-lac clarified that South Korea will not provide weapons to Ukraine, however. [69] Wi stated that this donation portrays South Korea’s commitment to international peace, security, and Ukraine’s recovery. [70] This is in accordance with South Korean law, which prohibits the export of military supplies to war zones. [71] Zelenskyy thanked Lee for the aid and requested continued support for Ukraine. [72] Former South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol gave $2-3 billion in humanitarian aid to Ukraine during his tenure and was intent on supplying military supplies to Ukraine. [73] The Yoon administration also provided non-lethal supplies to Ukraine in 2022, including body armor and helmets. [74]Lee and Zelenskyy agreed to act according to international law and norms when discussing the issue of North Korean POWs. [75] Lee likely views receiving the POWs as a priority due to the South Korean constitution’s North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Act, which obligates South Korea to protect the POWs. [76] The South Korean constitution states that North Korean defectors are automatically considered South Korean citizens. [77] Zelenskyy did not commit to returning the POWs to South Korea or Russia during the NATO Summit. Lee and Zelenskyy agreed to continue close discussions regarding security issues on the Korean Peninsula and South Korea-Ukraine relations. [78] North Korea and Russia will likely criticize the South Korean humanitarian aid to Ukraine and the strengthening of South Korea-Ukraine relations. This will likely make it more difficult to resume inter-Korean dialogue, a major priority for the Lee administration. [79]Endnotes:[1] https://www. kyivpost dot com/post/79862[2] https://www. kyivpost dot com/post/79862[3] https://www. kyivpost dot com/post/79862[4] https://militarywatchmagazine dot com/article/nkorea-12-million-152mm-shells-russia; https://www. nknews. org/2026/03/north-korea-has-sent-5k-containers-of-munitions-to-russia-since-august-seoul/[5] https://militarywatchmagazine dot com/article/nkorea-12-million-152mm-shells-russia[6] https://www. kyivpost dot com/post/79862[7] https://www. wsj. com/world/asia/north-korea-economy-success-e80f7062[8] https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/AKR20260707170700001?section=politics/diplomacy[9] https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/AKR20260708006900001?section=politics/diplomacy[10] https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/AKR20260708006900001?section=politics/diplomacy[11] https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/AKR20260708174700001?section=politics/diplomacy[12] https://www. khan. co dot kr/article/202607081501001[13] https://www. mk. co dot kr/news/world/11505374[14] https://www. joongang. co dot kr/article/25443329[15] https://www. yonhapnewstv. co dot kr/news/MYH20171102017300038[16] https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/MYH20260328005700038[17] https://www. joongang. co dot kr/article/25358811[18] https://www. news1 dot kr/diplomacy/unikorea/6225013[19] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1783740907-993990680/%ec%99%b8%eb%ac%b4%ec%84%b1-%eb%8c%80%eb%b3%80%ec%9d%b8-%eb%8b%b4%ed%99%94-%eb%b0%9c%ed%91%9c/[20] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1783740907-993990680/%ec%99%b8%eb%ac%b4%ec%84%b1-%eb%8c%80%eb%b3%80%ec%9d%b8-%eb%8b%b4%ed%99%94-%eb%b0%9c%ed%91%9c/[21] https://www. kinu. or dot kr/nksdb/overall. do?page=1&startDate=&endDate=&category=&keyword=&orderKey=date&orderDirection=DESC[22] https://www. kinu. or dot kr/nksdb/overall. do?page=1&startDate=&endDate=&category=&keyword=&orderKey=date&orderDirection=DESC[23] https://www. kinu. or dot kr/nksdb/overall. do?page=1&startDate=&endDate=&category=&keyword=&orderKey=date&orderDirection=DESC[24] https://www. kinu. or dot kr/nksdb/overall. do?page=1&startDate=&endDate=&category=&keyword=&orderKey=date&orderDirection=DESC[25] https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-january-13-2026/[26] https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/AKR20260708078951504?input=1195m[27] https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/AKR20260708078951504?input=1195m[28] https://www. nknews. org/pro/north-korea-china-smuggling-scheme-appears-to-restart-after-monthslong-lull/[29] https://www. nknews. org/pro/north-korea-china-smuggling-scheme-appears-to-restart-after-monthslong-lull/[30] https://nk. news1. kr/news/articles/6219352[31] https://www. nknews. org/pro/north-korea-china-smuggling-scheme-appears-to-restart-after-monthslong-lull/; https://www. yna. co. kr/view/AKR20260707084100009?section=nk/news/all[32] https://kcnawatch. org/newstream/1783764276-629884776/premier-of-dprk-cabinet-pak-thae-song-meets-chinese-president-xi-jinping/[33] https://www. fmprc. gov dot cn/zyxw/202607/t20260710_11979787. shtml[34] https://www. fmprc. gov dot cn/zyxw/202607/t20260710_11979787. shtml[35] https://www. fmprc. gov dot cn/zyxw/202607/t20260710_11979787. shtml[36] https://kcnawatch. org/newstream/1783824050-621728143/dprk-premier-meets-chairman-of-npc-standing-committee-of-prc/ ; https://kcnawatch. org/newstream/1783867682-55081670/premier-of-dprk-cabinet-pak-thae-song-meets-li-qiang-premier-of-prc-state-council/ ; https://www. fmprc. gov dot cn/zyxw/202607/t20260711_11980134. shtml[37] https://www. nknews. org/2026/07/north-korean-premier-meets-chinese-president-xi-ahead-of-alliance-anniversary/?t=1783951080https://kcnawatch. org/newstream/1783994686-838525889/chinese-party-and-government-delegation-to-pay-official-goodwill-visit-to-dprk/ ; https://www. news dot cn/world/20260714/f662f4b9cb8d4ab082c758d4d1c7eeb6/c. html ; https://www. nknews. org/2026/07/xi-jinpings-top-ideology-architect-to-visit-north-korea-state-media/[39] https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-july-7-2026/[40] https://understandingwar. org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-10-2025/[41] https://www. cnn. com/2024/04/10/china/china-delegation-northkorea-zhao-leji-intl-hnk ; https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-9-2025/[42] https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-9-2025/ ; https://www. 38north. org/2024/05/quick-take-north-korea-jabs-at-china-in-reaction-to-trilateral-summit/[43] https://www. scmp dot com/economy/china-economy/article/3356393/chinas-trade-north-korea-rebounds-9-year-high-xi-vows-deeper-ties[44] https://www. npr. org/2026/06/10/g-s1-127013/xi-jinping-visits-pyongyang-china-north-korea-ties ; https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-27-2026/[45] https://t dot me/tpp_vs/2524[46] https://www. nknews. org/2026/07/russian-companies-explore-north-korea-deals-in-meat-mining-and-machinery/; https://uralcci dot com/news/dialog-na-vostoke-uralskie-predpriyatiya-prolozhili-marshrut-dlya-sovmestnyh-proektov-s-kndr/[47] https://www. nknews. org/2026/07/russian-companies-explore-north-korea-deals-in-meat-mining-and-machinery/[48] https://uralcci dot com/news/dialog-na-vostoke-uralskie-predpriyatiya-prolozhili-marshrut-dlya-sovmestnyh-proektov-s-kndr/[49] https://uralcci dot com/news/dialog-na-vostoke-uralskie-predpriyatiya-prolozhili-marshrut-dlya-sovmestnyh-proektov-s-kndr/[50] https://bidzaar dot com/app/process/light/019e1c19-5a56-747f-8013-3eae285a795b[51] https://www. nknews. org/2026/07/russian-companies-explore-north-korea-deals-in-meat-mining-and-machinery/[52] https://www. nknews. org/2025/12/russia-north-korea-talks-likely-focused-on-resources-and-energy-photos-suggest/; https://www. nknews. org/2024/08/russian-power-grid-experts-visit-north-korea-to-discuss-energy-cooperation/; https://www. dailynk dot com/english/north-korea-expands-russia-partnership-beyond-military-ties-eyes-energy-resource-lifeline/[53] https://www. dailynk dot com/english/n-korea-credits-russia-cooperation-for-economic-gains-during-five-year-period/; https://www. nknews. org/2025/08/russia-trains-north-korean-experts-in-mineral-exploration-including-for-uranium/[54] https://www. hankookilbo dot com/news/article/A2026070213540004640[55] https://www. hankookilbo dot com/news/article/A2026070213540004640[56] https://unitv. unikorea. go dot kr/unitv/web/vod/view. do?id=8647&aid=79 ;https://www. yna. co dot kr/view/AKR20260703069600504?section=nk/news/all[57] https://www. kinu. or dot kr/main/module/report/view. do?nav_code=mai1674786581&category=53&idx=132835[58] https://www. donga dot com/news/Politics/article/all/20240201/123342551/1[59] https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-5-2026/[60] https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-5-2026/[61] https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar. org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-5-2026/[62] https://www. state. gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-rok-trilateral-foreign-ministers-meeting/; https://www. mofa. go. jp/a_o/na2/pageite_000001_01712. html; https://www. yna dot co. kr/view/AKR20260708001953071?section=politics/diplomacy[63] https://www. mofa. go dot kr/eng/brd/m_5476/view. do?seq=305870&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=6&titleNm= ; https://www. reuters. com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-japan-reaffirm-denuclearisation-goal-closer-defence-ties-2026-06-28/[64] https://www. state. gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-rok-trilateral-foreign-ministers-meeting/[65] https://www. reuters. com/world/americas/south-koreas-lee-tells-japan-countries-should-cooperate-amid-trade-challenges-2025-06-17/[66] https://www. asahi. com/ajw/articles/15849888?msockid=1e7993fab93767f3158c86ebb8786616[67] https://www. bloomberg. com/news/articles/2026-01-02/south-korea-s-lee-affirms-one-china-stance-before-meeting-xi[68] https://www. yna. co. kr/view/AKR20260708170651001?section=politics/diplomacy[69] https://www. yna. co. kr/view/AKR20260708006500001[70] https://www. yna. co. kr/view/AKR20260708006500001[71] https://elaw. klri. re. kr/eng_service/lawView. do?hseq=37529&lang=ENG[72] https://www. yna. co. kr/view/AKR20260708170651001?section=politics/diplomacy[73] https://www. reuters. com/world/south-korea-president-yoon-makes-surprise-visit-ukraine-yonhap-2023-07-15/; https://www. mofa. go. kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view. do?seq=322424&page=1[74] https://www. reuters. com/world/south-korea-president-yoon-makes-surprise-visit-ukraine-yonhap-2023-07-15/; https://kyivindependent dot com/south-korea-pledges-2-3-billion-in-aid-for-ukraine/[75] https://www. yna. co. kr/view/AKR20260708170651001?section=politics/diplomacy[76] https://elaw. klri. re. kr/eng_service/lawView. do?hseq=69121&lang=ENG[77] https://elaw. klri. re. kr/eng_service/lawView. do?lang=ENG&hseq=1[78] https://www. newsis. com/view/NISX20260708_0003701553[79] https://www. yna. co. kr/view/AKR20260701168600001?section=nk/news/all