Landmark Israel-Lebanon Agreement Intersects the U. S. -Iran Conflict - EUROPE SAYS
(AP Photo/Kevin Wolf)Bottom Line Up FrontThe Israel-Lebanon-U. S. “Trilateral Framework Agreement,” signed Friday, aligns the three governments in an effort to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah and marginalize Iran’s. . .
(AP Photo/Kevin Wolf)Bottom Line Up FrontThe Israel-Lebanon-U. S. “Trilateral Framework Agreement,” signed Friday, aligns the three governments in an effort to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah and marginalize Iran’s role in Lebanon’s internal affairs. The Israel-Lebanon framework is intended to contribute to regional transformation by envisioning an eventual normalization of relations between the two states. The pact seeks to empower the Beirut government by establishing a roadmap for Israeli forces to gradually withdraw from south Lebanon, but Lebanese critics assert the accord will neither produce an Israeli withdrawal nor dismantlement of Hezbollah’s militia. Iran asserts the Lebanon accord violates the U. S. -Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), but the pact, by itself, is unlikely to derail the U. S. -Iran peace process. After four days of intensive talks brokered by U. S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Lebanon and Israel signed a landmark accord, a Trilateral Framework Agreement, on Friday, that joins the three stakeholders in a determined effort to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah and eventually normalize relations between the two neighbors. The pact culminated months of Washington-based direct talks between Israeli and Lebanese government officials — the first such talks between the two since 1983 — that seeks to empower the Beirut government to affirm its sovereignty by curbing the autonomy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s militia forces. By transferring responsibility for Hezbollah disarmament from Israel to Beirut, the accord seeks to ensure that it is the Lebanese government, not Iran or Hezbollah, that receives the strategic credit for an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. The Framework builds on severalprevious Israel-Hezbollah ceasefiresas well as UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Iranian leaders characterize the U. S. -backed Lebanon pact as a purposeful contradiction and violation, at least in spirit, of the first article of the U. S. -IranMemorandum of Understanding (MOU)ending the U. S. -Israeli war against Iran. Article 1 of the MOU states that the U. S. , Israel, and Iran: “…declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other … and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final Deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph. ” Using its control of the Strait of Hormuz as strategic leverage, Iran demanded the inclusion of the MOU provision, calculating that the clause would require U. S. President Donald Trump to pressure the Israeli government to cease its offensive activities against Hezbollah. Iran assesses a ceasefire will give its key ally, Hezbollah, the opportunity to regroup and rearm after months of Israeli air strikes and ground against the group. In the interests of finalizing the Iran MOU and ending Tehran’s blockage of theStrait of Hormuz, President Trump’s team acquiesced to the Iranian demand to include Article 1 in the U. S. -Iran MOU. But U. S. officials insist the Trilateral Framework Agreement is consistent with the MOU, not a reversal of the U. S. commitment to Article 1. They note the Framework agreement offers a pathway for Israel to withdraw from the positions in Lebanon it has occupied since the U. S. -Iran war began. Iran and its supporters counter that the Trilateral accord does not specifically mandate that Israel cease its combat operations against Hezbollah and express skepticism the pact will result in a substantial Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. It is unclear whether Iran’s attacks last week on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz represent an expression of Iranian frustration with the Israel-Lebanon accord, or purely reflect Iranian opposition to U. S. efforts to end outright Iranian control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Still, most experts assess Iran’s opposition to the Lebanon accord will not manifest as an outright Iranian abrogation of the MOU or the peace process with the United States. Beyond the intent to dismantle Hezbollah’s militia, Iran’s strident opposition to the Lebanon framework is based, in part, on Tehran’s assessment that the framework would reduce Iran’s role not only in Lebanon, but in the broader region as well. The framework implies that both Israel and Lebanon are committed to an eventual normalization of relations, ending the state of war between them that has existed since 1948. The accord’s preamble states: “Israel and Lebanon affirm the right of each state to exist in peace, and their mutual desire to live in security as neighboring sovereign states. Israel and Lebanon hereby declare their intent to conclusively end the conflict, address its underlying causes, and to therewith formally conclude any state of war between them. ” The opening paragraph adds: “As reflected in this Trilateral Framework (“Framework”), and through future agreements, the two countries declare their ambition to end conflict between them, ensure the sovereignty and security of both countries, and establish peaceful neighborly relations between the two countries. ” In the view of U. S. and Israeli strategists and their regional allies, a normalization of relations between Israel and Lebanon would promote transformational, rather than incremental, change in the region by broadening the regional coalition opposed to Iran’s “resistance” ideology. The accord enshrines the alignment of Washington, Israel, and Beirut that Hezbollah, which has the allegiance of many Lebanese Shias, be denied the ability to initiate armed conflict with Israel or any neighboring state of its own volition. The three stakeholders assessed that the need to demobilize Hezbollah has become more urgent following the movement’s joining of Hamas’ war against Israel after theOctober 7, 2023attack and its attacks on northern Israel as part of Iran’s defense against the U. S. -Israeli war on Iran. In both instances, the government of Lebanon sought to remain neutral and uninvolved in Israel’s conflicts with other regional actors, Hamas and Iran respectively. The Trilateral Framework makes clear that one central intent is to establish the full sovereignty of the Lebanese government. It states: “The Government of Lebanon rejects the claims of any state or non-state actor to use force on its behalf without its explicit authorization, and reiterates that any claim by any state or non-state actor to exercise a military or security role is illegal per the decisions of the Lebanese Government and contrary to Lebanese national interests. ”In the four previous rounds of direct Israel-Lebanon talks that began in April, Lebanon, Israel and the U. S. have publicly demanded Hezbollah disarm, but Lebanon and Israel struggled to agree on the methods and time frame for its demobilization. Pursuant to a 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and subsequent U. S. -brokered understandings, Beirut directed theLebanese Armed Forces (LAF), in 2025, to undertake a disarmament program which, in order to avoid backlash from Hezbollah’s supporters, relied primarily on negotiated handovers of Hezbollah weaponry. The program’s limited scope and accomplishments failed to prevent Hezbollah from joining Iran’s defense against Operation Epic Fury by launching rockets and drones on northern Israel. Israel cited the failure of the program for its decision in March to drive deep into southern Lebanon to disarm the movement by force. The Lebanon pact, in essence, seeks to firmly locate the responsibility for disarming Hezbollah in Beirut, not Israel. The Trilateral Framework’s roadmap for the disarmament of Hezbollah will rely heavily on U. S. assistance to the LAF, and on a U. S. role monitoring implementation of the accord. The tripartite plan authorizes a “pilot program,” under which the LAF will take over a few Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions in south Lebanon initially, with the intent to gradually expand the handover throughout the south. As stated in the Framework: “…as part of the broader effort toward the Lebanese state’s monopoly of arms and sovereign territorial control, the LAF will gradually assume full and effective security responsibility in pilot zones, which will serve as the mechanism for phased and verified redeployments of the IDF and the deployments of the LAF. Two initial zones have been agreed to by the IDF and the LAF, and future pilot zones will also be agreed upon by mutual consent. Upon the confirmation of successful disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of their infrastructure in these zones, the LAF will assume full and effective security responsibility in these zones, internationally supported reconstruction efforts will begin, and Lebanese civilians will be able to safely return to these areas under the exclusive control of Lebanese state authorities. The United States intends to work closely with both countries to verify and support this process. ” However, Lebanese and other regional skeptics argue that the pact will not result in a full Israeli withdrawal or even constrain Israel’s ability to continue combating Hezbollah by air or on the ground. Facing a determined U. S. -backed effort to disarm Hezbollah, the group’s leaders and their supporters protested the Trilateral Framework. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassemdeclared the agreement “null and void,” calling it “humiliating, shameful, and a surrender of sovereignty. ” Hezbollah official Hassan Fadlallah, an elected deputy in the Lebanese parliament, warned the accord would produce “internal conflict” in Lebanon. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a moderate Shia who serves as an intermediary between global officials and Hezbollah, called for calm but also declared that the deal was an attempt to incite strife. As an indication of the potential for the framework to widen divisions in Lebanon, on Friday night, hours after the deal was announced, pro-Hezbollah protesters took to the streets of Beirut, waving the militant group’s yellow flags and denouncing the government. Many Lebanese who are not Hezbollah supporters criticized the deal as a government capitulation that is unlikely to end Israel’s military intervention in Lebanon. Some told journalists the Beirut government had little choice but to accept the pact, given its limited leverage in a war where Israel has technological superiority and unwavering U. S. support.