Migration as a weapon: The Ceuta crisis splits Europe and puts Schengen at risk - VIDEO | News. az
Editor’s note: Moses Becker is a special political commentator for News. Az. He holds a PhD in political science and specialises in inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. The views expressed in this. . .

Editor’s note: Moses Becker is a special political commentator for News. Az. He holds a PhD in political science and specialises in inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of News. Az. The mass arrival of migrants from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta has become more than just another humanitarian crisis on the European Union’s external border. The events have once again demonstrated how easily migration flows can be transformed into an instrument of political pressure — one capable of destabilising an individual state, triggering a diplomatic confrontation and deepening divisions within the EU. According to an official estimate bySpain’sMinistry of the Interior, around 50,000 people crossed the border intoCeutafrom the morning of 30 July. The authorities of the autonomous city cited an even higher figure of up to 60,000. By 31 July, approximately 25,000 of those who had arrived had already returned to Morocco. The reported death toll continued to change: local authorities initially reported at least 34 fatalities, while later reports in theSpanishmedia put the number at 43. RECOMMENDED STORIESHow pro-Iranian networks are forming in plain sight of German intelligence servicesMigrants leave Ceuta after border clash kills 57, Spain saysItaly halts Schengen agreement with Spain amid migration concernsAfrican swine fever found in Finland for first timeFor a small city with a population of around 85,000, an influx on such a scale was unprecedented. Migrants crossed the border by land, attempted to bypass coastal border barriers and swam to Spanish territory. The border protection system was effectively overwhelmed by the simultaneous movement of tens of thousands of people. Spain deployed military personnel and additional police units to Ceuta to support the Civil Guard. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who arrived inCeutaon 31 July, described the incident as a violation of Spain’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Madrid began accelerating the return of those who had no legal grounds to remain on Spanish territory and announced the establishment of a temporary processing centre. At the same time, the Spanish authorities stressed that Morocco was cooperating with them on the return of migrants. Madrid’s official explanation is that the mass crossing was provoked by human-smuggling networks. These groups allegedly spread misleading information about a recent ruling by Spain’s Supreme Court. The court had ruled that migrants intercepted at sea while attempting to reach Ceuta or Melilla could not automatically be returned under an expedited procedure. According to Sánchez, criminal networks misrepresented the ruling as the effective opening of the border and convinced thousands of people that arriving by sea would guarantee them the right to remain in Spain. However, the scale and coordinated nature of the events inevitably raised suspicions of a possible political dimension. No direct evidence has yet been presented that the Moroccan authorities deliberately organised the latest migration flow. On the contrary, Moroccan police subsequently used tear gas and water cannons in an attempt to push crowds away from the border. Nevertheless, the history of relations between Madrid and Rabat has led European capitals to view the situation as more than merely the work of smugglers. In May 2021, around 9,000 people entered Ceuta within a short period after Moroccan security forces temporarily relaxed border controls. That crisis unfolded amid a diplomatic dispute between Spain and Morocco over Spain’s decision to provide medical treatment to Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front. At the time, the European Parliament concluded that such a large-scale movement of people could hardly be regarded as spontaneous. In a resolution, lawmakers explicitly rejected Morocco’s use of border control, migration and unaccompanied minors as instruments of political pressure against an EU member state. The European Parliament stressed that the protection of Ceuta was a matter for the entire Union because the city forms part of Europe’s external border. This is why the latest crisis quickly moved beyond the framework of Spanish-Moroccan relations. European governments began discussing not only assistance for Spain but also possible measures against Madrid itself. Two opposing approaches emerged within the EU. Some countries demanded that Spain be punished for failing to protect the external border of the Schengen Area. Others argued that pressure on Spain represented a challenge to the entire European Union and required solidarity rather than mutual accusations. Photo: Getty ImagesItaly adopted the toughest position. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said Rome was prepared to use emergency instruments to protect its borders and the security of its citizens, including the possible suspension of Schengen arrangements with Spain. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani linked the crisis to the migration policy of the Sánchez government, arguing that Spain’s large-scale regularisation of undocumented migrants had created additional incentives for human-smuggling networks. However, as of the evening of 31 July, Italy had not announced the introduction of systematic checks on all passengers arriving from Spain. Rome’s position amounted primarily to a political threat and preparations for possible emergency measures. Madrid responded sharply to the Italian statements and summoned Italy’s ambassador. Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares accused the Italian side of partisan demagoguery and called for European solidarity. Italy’s position received support in Finland. Interior Minister Mari Rantanen said Spain had completely failed to protect the external border of the Schengen Area and urged other European countries to support Meloni’s proposal. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Riikka Purra also called for the toughest possible restrictions. However, the largest party in Finland’s governing coalition, led by Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, did not officially endorse calls to restrictSpain’sparticipation in Schengen. Finland’s reaction therefore remains the position of individual ministers rather than a formally adopted policy of the entire government. Denmark also joined calls to consider radical measures. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen urged the EU to immediately deploy all necessary instruments and said that suspending Schengen cooperation with Spain should not be ruled out. She warned that Europe must not allow a repeat of the 2015 migration crisis. Copenhagen, however, has not yet announced any additional national border checks specifically in response to the events in Ceuta. France became the first major European country to move from political statements to practical action. Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez ordered an immediate reinforcement of controls along the French-Spanish border. He also instructed rapid-response units to conduct more extensive checks. French authorities did not specify exactly how border-crossing procedures would change or whether the tighter controls would be temporary or remain in place for a longer period. Paris’s actions have both practical and political significance. France fears so-called secondary movements, in which migrants who enter one EU country subsequently attempt to reach other member states. At the same time, the crisis is being actively used by France’s right-wing political forces. Marine Le Pen said that, if she came to power, she would seek to restrict freedom of movement within the Schengen Area primarily to citizens of European countries. Germany adopted a more restrained position. Chancellor Friedrich Merz stressed that protecting the EU’s external borders was essential to combating illegal migration and called on Spain to restore control over the situation. Berlin, however, did not announce any new restrictions or additional checks directly linked to the Ceuta crisis. Sweden took a similar approach. The Swedish prime minister urged Madrid to act quickly and bring the situation under control. Stockholm indicated that it was prepared to consider further steps depending on how events developed, but no specific border measures were announced. Photo: Getty ImagesBelgium, unlike Italy, Finland and Denmark, emphasised European solidarity. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot said that pressure on a state located on the EU’s external border was a Europe-wide problem. In his view, Spain must secure the border, but it is also entitled to support from European institutions and cooperation from Morocco. Brussels backed the return of people who had crossed the border illegally and stronger action against smugglers, but opposed turning the crisis solely into an instrument of political pressure on Madrid. The European Commission also adopted a more cautious position. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the situation as unacceptable and said illegal crossings had to be stopped, while returns should be carried out swiftly and in accordance with European rules. European Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner said Brussels supported close cooperation between Spain and Morocco and was prepared to provide additional assistance through EU agencies. Brunner also highlighted an important legal detail that many European politicians appear to prefer to overlook. Ceuta and Melilla have a special status under the Schengen arrangements. People who enter Ceuta do not automatically acquire the right to travel freely to mainland Spain or other EU countries. Spanish authorities are required to maintain passport and document checks on sea and air routes from Ceuta and Melilla. Consequently, claims that tens of thousands of migrants have already gained unrestricted access to the whole of Europe are legally inaccurate. Calls to “exclude Spain from Schengen” are also primarily political slogans. Italy, Finland or any other individual country cannot unilaterally deprive Spain of its membership in the Schengen Area. National governments may temporarily reintroduce controls at their internal borders where there is a serious threat to public order or internal security. Such measures must be justified, proportionate, limited in duration and used only as a last resort. As of the evening of 31 July, therefore, the actual measures taken by European countries remained considerably more limited than their political rhetoric suggested. France had reinforced checks on its border with Spain. Italy had threatened emergency measures but had not confirmed their full implementation. Finland and Denmark supported the idea of restricting Schengen cooperation with Madrid but had not taken practical steps of their own. Germany and Sweden called on Spain to restore control, while Belgium advocated a coordinated and solidarity-based European response. The gap between political statements and actual measures shows that the crisis is already being exploited in domestic political struggles. For Meloni, Rantanen, Frederiksen and France’s right-wing parties, the events in Ceuta serve as evidence of the need for the toughest possible migration policy. For the Sánchez government, by contrast, the crisis has become an argument in favour of jointly protecting the EU’s external border and combating criminal networks rather than punishing Spain. Photo: Getty ImagesThis is precisely where the main danger of the geopolitical weaponisation of migration lies. To exert pressure on Europe, it is not necessary to transport tens of thousands of people directly to Paris, Rome or Berlin. It is enough to create a crisis at one section of the EU’s external border, generate fears of further migrant movements and provoke a conflict between European capitals. The migrants themselves are not the weapon. Many are acting under the pressure of poverty, unemployment, disinformation or promises made by smugglers. The weapon is the controlled or deliberately directed flow of people, created when state or non-state actors establish the conditions for mass movement at a politically chosen moment. The European Union already officially regards the instrumentalisation of migration as a hybrid threat, alongside sabotage, cyberattacks, election interference and information operations. According to the Council of the EU, such actions are directed not only against the physical security of borders but also aim to divide societies, undermine trust and weaken political decision-making. Europe’s response to the events in Ceuta, however, reveals the absence of a common strategy. Some countries are prepared to close their internal borders, others demand accelerated deportations, while a third group insists on supporting Spain. As a result, pressure on one section of the external border is transformed into a threat to freedom of movement across the entire Union. Should every such escalation be accompanied by mutual accusations and the restoration of internal borders, states or other actors using migration as a means of pressure will effectively achieve their objective. They will weaken trust among EU members, strengthen radical political parties and cast doubt on the long-term resilience of the Schengen Area. The European Union therefore needs not only more effective border protection but also a political mechanism for responding to the deliberate instrumentalisation of migration. Such a mechanism should include rapid assistance to states located on the external border, a stronger role for Frontex, faster lawful return procedures, intensified action against smuggling networks and possible financial or diplomatic measures against countries that consciously use migration flows as leverage. Photo: European ComissionThe main lesson of the Ceuta crisis is that Spain’s border is also the border of the entire European Union. Unless Europe develops a collective response, migration will continue to serve as one of the cheapest and most effective instruments of hybrid pressure against the EU. (If you possess specialized knowledge and wish to contribute, please reach out to us at[email protected]). News. Az