Moldova’s Ruling Party PAS Must Graduate From Crisis Management to State Governance - EUROPE SAYS
Moldova’s ruling party, PAS, was first elected in 2021 on domestic agenda pledges: to restore the rule of law, combat corruption, and improve living standards. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. . .
Moldova’s ruling party, PAS, was first elected in 2021 on domestic agenda pledges: to restore the rule of law, combat corruption, and improve living standards. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reshaped Moldova’s political landscape, allowing PAS to frame politics as a choice between a European future and Russian influence. Now the domestic agenda is once again front and center as the government faces a series of simultaneous tests: several corruption scandals, the government’s collapse, botched reforms, the reintegration of the breakaway region of Transnistria, and the tense relationship with another region, Gagauzia. While none of these challenges individually threatens PAS’s hold on power, the cumulative pressure is beginning to erode President Maia Sandu’s reputation for competent, principled, and reform-oriented governance. Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu’s resignation on July 3 after only eight months in office transformed an emerging governance problem into a political crisis. The prime ministerstatedthat he could no longer exercise his mandate in accordance with his “principles and values. ”The immediatetriggerwas a scandal over Moldova’s civil aviation safety authority, MoldATSA. The discovery that the company’s head hadfalsifiedhis pilot’s license and university diploma exposed serious failures in the state’s vetting and appointment process. The scandalsubsequently expandedinto the “Verișoara” (female cousin in Romanian) affair after it emerged that Sandu’s cousin simultaneously heldhighly remuneratedadvisory positions at both MoldATSA and the State Chancellery. Investigative journalistsuncovereda pattern of politically connected appointments, inflatedremuneration, questionable qualifications, and weak oversight across state institutions and state-owned enterprises. Importantly, the scandals have also highlighted the progress in the fight against corruption in Moldova: unlike in the pre-PAS era, the cases emerged through investigative journalism and have resulted in a series of resignations. Corruption has not disappeared, but evolved, taking the form of lower-level patronage and politically connected appointments, which undermine PAS’s claim to represent a fundamentally different way of governing. The fate of the short-lived Munteanu cabinet also illustrates the limits of the PAS model. The prime minister entered office as a respected technocrat with strong financial credentials but without an independent political constituency. Much of the senior administrative structure inherited from former Prime Minister Dorin Recean remained intact, fueling persistent perceptions that Recean continued toexerciseconsiderable influence behind the scenes. Munteanu never fully controlled either his office or the wider executive, limiting his ability to establish himself as an autonomous political actor. Whether or not the scandals directly caused his resignation, they increasingly became his political responsibility while remaining largely outside his political control. More importantly, the episode exposed growing tensions within PAS itself, where policy coordination has visibly deteriorated. Debates over appointments, reform priorities, and control of state institutions have become visible to the public. Strategic authority has long remained concentrated in the narrow circle around President Sandu. During earlier crises, this centralization enabled rapid decision-making, but it also concentrated political responsibility. As governance failures accumulate, they increasingly reflect on the president herself. Those scandals were preceded by the collapse of the government’s fiscal reform, which among other things included the abolition of discounted VAT rates. Following widespread criticism, Sandupublicly intervenedto pause the package, while controversial measures were subsequently withdrawn or postponed one after another. Observers interpreted the retreat as a political calculation ahead of local elections next year, but the policymakingprocessitself was more revealing. Finance Minister Andrian Gavriliță acknowledged that the package had reached the public without meaningful consultation across government, citing time constraints and the sequencing ofnegotiationswith the IMF. The resulting disagreements quickly spilled into the open, with the health ministerpublicly rejectingparts of the proposal (VAT increase) and other ministries distancing themselves from key provisions. The episode exposed an overall weakness in the government’s capacity to coordinate complex reforms. Responsibility for inter-ministerial coordination formally rests with the prime minister’s office, yet Munteanu remainedlargely absentfrom the debate, reinforcing perceptions that the government lacked an effective political center. By explaining the reform’s timing and fiscal objectives through the prism of IMF and EU integrationrequirements, the authorities shifted political responsibility for unpopular measures onto external actors. The result was a reform that appeared neither politically owned nor institutionally coordinated. Similar patterns have become evident in theprotractedjudicial reform, thecontentiousdecentralization agenda, thepublic administrationreform, and in Moldova’s unresolved territorial questions. Although Transnistria and Gagauzia differ fundamentally in their legal status and political dynamics, Chișinău demonstrates a reactive style in both, managing immediate challenges without addressing the underlying political disputes. In Transnistria, the Moldovan government has made quantifiable progress in advancing the region’s economic and regulatory reintegration without reopening negotiations on its final political status. TheproposedConvergence Fund, under which Transnistrian companies registered in Moldova would contribute to the national budget, represents another step in this gradual reintegration strategy. Still, Chișinău continues to avoid the politically sensitive question of the future of Russian troops stationed in the statelet, expecting the EU to assume responsibility for these issues. However, key member states, such as Germany and France, have increasingly aligned behind the principle of “no EU integration without reintegration. ” This exposes a divergence within the EU: while the Commission is preparing for post-transition scenarios, including contingency planning, major member states remain reluctant to assume responsibility for the security dimensions of any future settlement. Local economic realitiescontinueto work in Chișinău’s favor. Once Transnistria’s energy lifeline, Russia now only provides periodic gas payments, while the Sheriff holding (Transnistria’s biggest company)has becomethe breakaway region’s fiscal backstop by financing pensions, social spending, and local budgets. The stateletsurvivesthrough this combination of shrinking Russian support, Sheriff’s accumulated capital, and growing integration into Moldova’s economу. With more residents seeking employment in territory controlled by Chișinău and dependence on Moldovan financial institutions increasing, economic reintegration is continuing independently of political negotiations. Gagauzia presents the opposite problem. Here, the government has largely deferred political engagement while increasingly relying on judicial instruments to manage tensions. The Constitutional Court’sreviewof Gagauzia’s electoral legislation, following earlier rulings reducing the autonomy’s institutional prerogatives,reflectsChișinău’s efforts to strengthen constitutional authority and dismantle the remaining political influence of the fugitive pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor’s network. In Gagauzia, however, these measures are perceived as a gradual erosion of the autonomy guaranteed to the region by the 1994 settlement. Although the government hasreopeneddialogue with local authorities, theprolonged absenceof elected regional institutions and the continuing legal proceedings have left political grievances unresolved. Both cases reveal a similar governing logic. In Transnistria, economic integration compensates for the absence of political progress. In Gagauzia, legal harmonization has substituted for political engagement. This approach has so far allowed the government to avoid the most difficult constitutional questions. Yet in Transnistria, eventual reintegration will inevitably require political and security decisions that Moldova cannot indefinitely outsource to Brussels. In Gagauzia, continued reliance on courts rather than political compromise risks deepening alienation within the autonomous region while leaving space for external actors to exploit local grievances. None of the developments fundamentally alters Moldova’s strategic trajectory. European integration remains PAS’s unchallenged political project commanding broad public support. A new government is being formed, and PAS has a parliamentary majority, while the opposition remains fragmented, financially constrained, and compromised. PAS has proven effective at managing successive crises. The next phase, however, will require a shift from crisis management tostate management. That means building stronger institutions, embracing more inclusive policymaking, improving coordination across government, and addressing politically difficult questions before they evolve into crises. For several years, geopolitics and European integration have enabled PAS to dominate the political agenda and absorb the political costs of governance shortcomings. That equilibrium is gradually shifting. As Moldova advances through the accession process, the European Commission is returning to a more traditional enlargement pattern, placing greater emphasis on administrative capacity, accountability, and implementation. Whether PAS can adapt its governing model to these demands may ultimately prove more consequential for Moldova’s European future than the pace of its accession negotiations. If enlargement slows or becomes increasingly transactional, the temptation will inevitably be to seek a new strategic narrative—such asreunification with Romania. Yet no geopolitical project can substitute for the unfinished task that first brought PAS to power: building a capable, accountable state that governs effectively.