One foot out: Understanding Bulgaria’s geopolitical shift under Radev – European Council on Foreign Relations - EUROPE SAYS
ProblemBulgaria hasagreed to hostup to eight American refuelling tankers at its Bezmer military base to support US operations in the Middle East. The announcement came just days after prime minister Rumen. . .
ProblemBulgaria hasagreed to hostup to eight American refuelling tankers at its Bezmer military base to support US operations in the Middle East. The announcement came just days after prime minister Rumen Radevwithdrew his countryfrom the European coalition of the willing (CoW) for Ukraine, arguing that military support would only prolong the war and that Bulgaria lacks the resources to contribute. Radev has put the final decision on Bezmer to a vote in Bulgaria’s parliament, allowing him to spread the political responsibility and limit direct ownership of the move. Now the prime minister can maintain his rather clumsy position: by rejecting military support for Ukraine (despiteprevious parliament votes) and justifying logistical support for American military operations elsewhere, he hopes to preserve US security guarantees without dedicating Bulgaria to Europe’s developing security architecture. These decisions expose a growing inconsistency in Bulgaria’s strategic posture. Sofia is distancing itself from European efforts to strengthen Ukraine and is planning for its own defence, while simultaneously supporting Washington’s military operation in the Middle East. Rather than aligning with the broadlypro-European consensus and anti-American sentimentsin Bulgarian society, Radev is attempting to balance competing security frameworks without sufficiently considering European security interests. This ambiguity also presents a broader challenge for Europe. As the Trump administration continues to conduct foreign policy through bargaining, some European governments appear tempted to pursue bilateral arrangements with Washington rather than invest in European unity. Such behaviour risks weakening collective defence, precisely when strategic coordination is needed. SolutionEuropean security cannot rely on member states choosing cooperation only when politically convenient. The EU needs to engage more actively with the Bulgarian government and push back on Radev’s form of hedging while political conditions remain favourable, to help strengthen defence cooperation among the EU’s 27 member states. The EU should also reinforce the political and practical incentives for participation in common defence initiatives, for example through its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and other European defence instruments. At the same time, it needs to reduce opportunities for external powers—particularly China, Russia and the US —to exploit divisions, institutional weaknesses and the strategic ambiguity encouraged by MAGA. Bulgaria’s recent work to delist two Russian oligarchs and a Russian patriarch from the EU’s 21st sanctions package is an example of Russia’s growing leverage overthe government in Sofia. Overall, the EU should treat Bulgaria as an urgent political case rather than a lost cause. This is especially true given that, in 2027,Europe will see several major electionswhich have the potential to return governments that are more concerned with nationalism than European unity. This, in turn, would constrain the political space in which governments committed to a strong European foreign and security policy can act. ContextSince taking office in May 2026, Radev has gradually shifted Bulgaria’s foreign policy away from alignment with its European partners. Bulgaria did not jointhe international agreementto establish the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, nor did Radev attendMay’s B9 summitin Bucharest. Bulgaria’s decision to leave the CoW hasattracted strong criticismfrom pro-European parties and raises broader questions about Bulgaria’s long-term strategic orientation. The latest move in Bezmer followsthe previous deploymentof as many as 15 US tanker aircraft at Sofia Airport between February and June, which sparked political controversy. The government ended the deployment, which was linked to arrangements for (unsuccessful) discussions on Bulgaria’s inclusion in theUS Visa Waiver Program, on June 30th. Delays in military modernisation and uncertainty surrounding planned defence-industrial cooperation, including aRheinmetall partnership, are compounding Sofia’s lack of clarity about whether it intends to become a consistent contributor to Europe’s security architecture. As it stands, Radev appears to be pursuing more transactional, case-by-case relationships with both Europe and the US. The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.