Russia-Ukraine: Has the tide really turned? - EUROPE SAYS
With Kyiv’s back against the wall, Putin judged time was on his side. If he could not achieve his objectives through US-sponsored negotiations, he would eventually do so on the battlefield. Over recent months,. . .
With Kyiv’s back against the wall, Putin judged time was on his side. If he could not achieve his objectives through US-sponsored negotiations, he would eventually do so on the battlefield. Over recent months, the war appears to have turned a corner. Russian battlefield progress has largelystalled (Opens in new window); its costly assaults are not yielding significant territorial gains. And despite substantial financial incentives, Russia is finding it harder to recruit new personnel (especially specialists) to make good its huge casualties, estimated at more than30,000 a month (Opens in new window). Meanwhile, having stabilised the front lines, Ukraine is increasingly taking the war to Russia’s heartland. Its domestically developed medium and long-range drones and missiles are striking damaging blows to Russian supply lines and energy and military-related industrial infrastructure as far away as the Urals. Ukraine’s rapid progress on drone technology is attracting keen interest from Gulf and Western states. All this has boosted Kyiv’s confidence and brought a more muscular tone to Ukraine’s diplomacy – includingtaunting (Opens in new window)Putin. Warnings by Zelenskyy to Belarus against becoming actively involved in the war are hitting home, eliciting ameek response (Opens in new window)from Minsk. With the brake hitherto applied by former Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán now removed, substantial EU financial assistance is flowing, easing budgetary pressure on Kyiv (although the deepening spat between Warsaw and Kyiv over historical grievances is aworrying (Opens in new window)development). Meanwhile, Russia’s economy isunder pressure (Opens in new window). Inflation is rising, as is deficit spending. With the war economy demanding enormous financial and labour resources, the non-military economy is in trouble. Growth slipped into reverse in the first half of this year. Higher oil and gas revenues arising from the Iran war helped, but less than expected, and Ukrainian attacks have curbed oil refining and export capacity. Putin has admitted that Ukraine’s strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure are causingdifficulties (Opens in new window). Russian-occupied Crimea is increasingly isolated, its main supply routes vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks, while fuel is being rationed. This is symbolically embarrassing for the Kremlin, turning what was a strategic prize into a logistical liability. It also diminishes Crimea’s value as a base for military operations. In these circumstances, could the Kremlin be forced to reappraise how it can achieve its political objectives?One option is escalation through the wider mobilization of reservists. That might bring some military gains at the front but is fraught with domestic political and economic risks, which is why the Kremlin has avoided it so far. Alternatively, Russia could simply persist with its current failing approach, seeking to grind Ukraine down (and weaken Western resolve) through attrition. But might Moscow instead now be pressed to accept aceasefire (Opens in new window)? This is clearly the goal of Zelenskyy’s campaign of unremitting missile and drone attacks on Russian infrastructure. But this seems speculative and premature: there’s no evidence that Russia is even interested in a ceasefire. Certainly, Moscow would only accept one that locks in its gains and enables Moscow to pursue an eventual final settlement on Russia’s terms. Settling for anything else would expose the paucity of what Russia’s costly four-year war has achieved so far.