Sweeping Military Purges Leave China Scrambling to Fill Senior Command Posts - Vision Times
With the PLA’s centenary slated for 2027, Chinese leader Xi Jinping now finds himself grappling with a shrinking pool of senior generals to rebuild a command structure battered by years of upheaval
Years of sweeping purgeshave left China’s military with an unusual number of vacancies at the top, putting leader Xi Jinping under pressure to rebuild the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) senior leadership before a key military milestone in 2027. Now,attention is increasingly turningto the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Fifth Plenum, slated for October, where Beijing could begin filling some of those vacancies. Among the questions are whether Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin will be elevated to the Politburo and whether additional members will be appointed to the military’s top decision-making body. The Politburo serves as China’s top ruling body. The uncertainty comes after an extraordinary period of upheaval within the PLA. A succession of senior military figures have been removed since the CCP’s 20th National Congress, dramatically reshaping the leadership overseeing the world’s largest standing military. RELATED:Former CSRC Vice Chairman Under Probe as China’s Financial Purge DeepensThe seven-member CMC elected in 2022 has been particularly hard hit by the turmoil, leaving Xi with an unusually thin pool of senior officers from which to rebuild the command structure. A shrinking pool of senior generalsSIGN UP FOR OUR FREE NEWSLETTERFor the best of our weekly content！There is something wrong, please try again laterSuccessYou are now signed up for our newsletterSuccessCheck your email to complete sign upBeijing has recently shown signs of beginning that rebuilding process. On July 3, Xipromoted two officersto the rank of full general: Zhang Shuguang, who heads the military’s disciplinary apparatus, and Air Force commander Wang Gang. Zhang’s promotion has attracted particular attention because the head of the CMC’s disciplinary body has traditionally also served as a member of the commission. Whether he will formally join the CMC could therefore offer an early indication of how Xi intends to reconstruct the military leadership. Defense Minister Dong Junpresents another unusual case. Dong became defense minister in December 2023 but has not received positions traditionally associated with the office, including membership in the CMC or appointment as a state councillor. The personnel shortages extend beyond the commission itself. A number of senior posts across the PLA’s theater commands, service branches, and central military departments have undergone leadership changes amid the continuing anti-corruption campaign. Replacing those officers, however, presents its own risks, analysts note. 2027 deadline loomsChristopher Nye, a nonresident fellow at the Jamestown Foundation,has arguedthat Xi is running short on time to rebuild the PLA’s depleted senior ranks ahead of the military’s politically-significant centenary on Aug. 1 2027. The date marks the centenary of the PLA’s founding and the target date for what Beijing calls its “centenary goals” for military modernization. The anniversary is expected to provide Xi with an important opportunity to showcase the PLA’s progress and its readiness as a modern fighting force. RELATED:Xi’s Move Against Ma Xingrui Linked to Secretive Political-Business NetworkBut the upheaval within the officer corps complicates that message. According to Nye, the problem is not simply the number of positions that need to be filled. Years of investigations and removals have also disrupted the patronage networks through which senior officers rose through the ranks, making rapid promotions potentially risky. The result is a difficult equation for Xi, including having numerous positions to fill, fewer trusted senior officers to fill them, and limited time before the politically significant 2027 anniversary. The vacancies within the CMC may prove particularly difficult because its members are typically selected from among the PLA’s highest-ranking generals, leaving Beijing with a substantially narrower pool of candidates. The October plenum could provide the first indication of whether Xi intends to move quickly or leave the broader reconstruction of the military leadership until the CCP’s 21st Party Congress in 2027. Either way, the personnel upheaval has created an unusual challenge for a leader who has spent more than a decade consolidating control over the armed forces: Rebuilding a command structure weakened in significant part by his own campaign to purge it.