The view from Damascus: Syria’s first political battle - EUROPE SAYS
Before investment could begin in earnest, three indispensable foundations had to be laid: a modern banking system, a clear legal framework, and an administration founded on sound governance. Without them,. . .
Before investment could begin in earnest, three indispensable foundations had to be laid: a modern banking system, a clear legal framework, and an administration founded on sound governance. Without them, capital would struggle to reach Syria, leaving the country unable to confront its deepening economic and social crisis. The need for investment is urgent. Poverty continues to spread as energy prices and the cost of basic goods rise. Large numbers of workers in both the public and private sectors have lost their jobs, while the government searches urgently for the resources needed to cover the deficit and finance the budget. A woman waits for customers at a market in the northern Syrian city of Raqqa on 23 December, 2022, amid soaring inflation and a deepening economic crisisAgainst this background, conversations in the lobbies of the capital’s grand hotels have acquired an added significance. Businesspeople mingle with Western and Arab diplomats alongside representatives of private security firms. Discussions continue almost without pause as those gathered seek to understand developments across the country and trace the links between security, politics, and economics. The greatest surprise came neither from the streets nor from Washington, Paris, or Ankara. It came from beneath the dome of the People’s Assembly. The first political battleThe People’s Assembly was the last institution of the new phase to take shape, following the Victory Conference, the Constitutional Declaration, the National Dialogue, the Constitutional Court, the government, and the various public bodies. Its composition was neither wholly appointed nor wholly elected. It combined elements of both. Like much else in Syria’s transition, the formula was pragmatic rather than theoretical. The assembly’s inaugural session had been scheduled for 6 July, coinciding with Macron’s arrival in Damascus. Ahead of the sitting, al-Sharaa completed its formation by appointing 70 members under the president’s one-third allocation. The appointments were intended to correct imbalances among the elected two-thirds, particularly the limited representation of women and certain non-Arab communities. The assembly was expected to convene with 206 of its 210 members present. Three seats allocated to Suwayda remained vacant, while a fourth had fallen empty after the death of a member. Even before its inaugural session, however, the fledgling body was proving to be more than a ceremonial institution. From its earliest moments, efforts were under way to form blocs, alliances, and balances of power. Members in several provinces held coordination meetings to choose candidates for speaker, the two deputy speakerships, and the post of secretary. The Aleppo bloc stood out in particular. With 46 members, it pressed its claim to the speakership on the strength of its numerical and political weight. Some observers linked the bloc to the Muslim Brotherhood, although its members firmly denied any organisational ties. This marked a striking departure in Syria’s political life. For many years, discussion of blocs, coordination, or negotiations over senior office had been absent. Now, even in an embryonic form, they had returned to the chamber. The inaugural session was consequently postponed for a week. The delay allowed Macron’s visit to Damascus and al-Sharaa’s subsequent trip to Ankara to conclude, while consultations continued over the conduct of the first sitting and the election of the assembly’s leadership. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (top, centre) addressing the first session of Syria’s new transitional parliament in Damascus, 12 July, 2026On Saturday evening, the night before the session, al-Sharaa met all members. The discussion focused on the consultations already under way. Participants stressed the need to avoid regional blocs and external affiliations, while the names of candidates for speaker, the two deputy speakerships, and secretary circulated among the members. The real surprise lay in the ballot boxes. The results differed from what many political circles had expected. Abdul Hamid al-Awak, from Hasakah, was elected speaker. Madonna Beshara, a Christian from Latakia, and Mustafa Mousa, from Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib, were chosen as his deputies. Moayad Habib, from Aleppo, became secretary of the assembly. Once the initial surprise had passed, a different dynamic emerged. The contest had become a test of the ‘new Syria’ and of the institutions created in its name. Would those institutions function exactly as their architects intended, or would they begin to produce their own balances?What do the results mean?For several Western diplomats who followed the process closely, the outcome signified far more than an internal parliamentary election. Some regarded it as the first institution established since the fall of the Assad regime whose formation had not been predetermined in every detail. The results consequently became the subject of extensive political and diplomatic discussion. One interpretation gained particular currency. Members who had accumulated political and organisational experience through their work in Syrian opposition institutions between 2011 and 2026 proved especially skilled at mobilising support, forging understandings, and managing alliances within the assembly. Their experience gave them a clear advantage over figures who had entered the assembly from different backgrounds. This development also formed part of the wider context preceding the assembly’s creation. The Victory Conference, held on 29 January 2025, had announced the dissolution of all previous political, military, and civil institutions. Several figures who had served in opposition bodies, particularly the Syrian National Coalition, were subsequently brought back into public life and entrusted with new responsibilities. Some joined the committee overseeing the assembly elections, while others entered the new parliament. Signs of this adjustment soon appeared in appointments to sensitive security and administrative institutions. Rebalancing the stateDeputy Interior Minister Abdul Qader Tahhan, who comes from Aleppo, was appointed director of the General Intelligence Service. The move places one of Syria’s most important security posts in the hands of its ‘economic capital’. Tahhan succeeded Major General Hussein Salameh, who moved to head the National Security Office. A photograph shows rooftops and minarets in Aleppo on July 17, 2026. Brigadier General Dirar al-Shamlan was also appointed deputy interior minister, strengthening the representation of Deir ez-Zor and its countryside at senior levels. At the same time, consultations continued over the appointment of figures from Daraa, the ‘cradle of the revolution’, and Homs, its ‘heart’, to other leadership posts. The reshuffle reflected an effort to rebuild political and geographical balance within the institutions of the new state, in keeping with the parliamentary results and preventing them from becoming an early source of tension. A growing number of observers concluded that the episode carried deeper significance. The unexpected election results may offer the first indication that the People’s Assembly will not simply serve as a chamber for endorsing decisions prepared elsewhere. Even within the limits of the transitional phase, it could become a space in which genuine alliances, competing interests and political disagreements emerge. From arms to politicsThis gave Damascus’s first ‘political battle’ its true significance. The contest concerned the nature of political life to come, rather than the individuals chosen to occupy particular offices. Because the assembly’s inaugural session produced results that had not all been determined in advance, future sittings may bring more complex debates over parliamentary procedure, laws governing political parties, electoral legislation, and the permanent constitution. These questions will determine the shape of the Syrian state in the years ahead. A shepherd boy uses a mobile phone as he sits next to a goat while the rest of his flock grazes next to old ruins in the village of Barad, north of Aleppo in northern Syria, on July 18, 2026. This may be the most important change Damascus has witnessed over the past fortnight. During the war, the balance of power in the capital was measured by the number of rifles, the scale of the front lines, and the maps of military control. A different measure is now quietly asserting itself: the ability to build coalitions, organise votes, and manage disagreement within public institutions. The paradox is that these new battles will be fought elsewhere. Their arenas will be the parliamentary chamber, the texts of laws, the articles of the constitution, and the corridors of the institutions through which the ‘new Syria’ is seeking to build its legitimacy. The years of war shaped Syria through the force of arms. The years ahead may reshape it through the force of politics. Anyone observing the capital today can see that the question is no longer simply how the war ended, but how Syria will be governed after the war and under what political system.