The West Is Selling Lobito as a Defeat for China. It Isn’t
Is the Lobito Corridor mostly hype? The question, raised last week in a podcast about the project, deserves more than a yes-or-no answer. The railway exists, and financing is moving forward. But the narrative portraying Lobito as a major setback for China in Africa is moving much faster than the. . .
Is the Lobito Corridor mostly hype? The question, raised last week in apodcastabout the project, deserves more than a yes-or-no answer. The railway exists, and financing is moving forward. But the narrative portraying Lobito as a major setback for China in Africa is moving much faster than the trains. The United States and the European Union present Lobito as their main response to Beijing’s influence in Africa’s mining sector. The corridor is intended to connect copper-producing regions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and, eventually, Zambia to Angola’s port of Lobito. In this telling, minerals would leave supply chains dominated by Chinese interests and move closer to Western markets. The problem is that copper does not switch sides simply because it changes ports. The Angolan section is already operational. Its modernization is backed by $753 million in financing, and initial trial shipments showed that it could sharply reduce transit times from southern DRC. But the connection to Zambia’s mines has yet to be built. Major Copperbelt producers continue to use routes to Dar es Salaam, Durban or Beira. More importantly, China is not absent from Lobito. It is already at the center of the mineral supply the corridor is designed to transport. Kamoa-Kakula, the mine that currently offers the strongest commercial case for the corridor, is 39. 6% owned by China’s Zijin Mining. Some of its production has already been sold to Chinese buyers linked to the mine’s shareholders. Beyond that example, the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) noted that 15 of the 19 largest copper mines located in Katanga (DRC) were operated or majority-financed by Chinese groups. Those companies could themselves use Lobito if the route becomes more competitive. A Western-financed railway could therefore serve mining supply chains dominated by Beijing. This is where the Western narrative begins to unravel. In mining, power does not lie only in railways. It also lies in control of mineral assets, financing, purchase agreements, refining capacity and access to markets. China remains firmly established in all of those areas. Beijing is also financing the modernization of TAZARA, another railway linking Zambia to Tanzania’s port of Dar es Salaam and often presented as Lobito’s rival. The DRC is welcoming Western capital without excluding Chinese groups. Angola is diversifying its partnerships without picking sides. That is what the Western narrative misses. African governments are not necessarily looking to choose the United States and Europe over China. They are seeking to diversify their transport routes and funding sources while retaining the flexibility to work with all sides. Lobito could deliver real logistics gains for Africa. But casting it as evidence of China’s retreat goes well beyond what the facts currently support. Louis-Nino Kansoun