Why China has sharply increased maritime pressure on Taiwan | News. az
Editor’s note: Zaur Nurmamedov is a journalist and a graduate of the Faculty of Political Science at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1993–1999). He. . .
Editor’s note: Zaur Nurmamedov is a journalist and a graduate of the Faculty of Political Science at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1993–1999). He previously served as first deputy editor-in-chief of the Vesti. Az news portal (2009–2023). The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect the position of News. Az. The sharp rise in the activity of Chinese government vessels around Taiwan indicates that Beijing is gradually expanding its pressure campaign beyond the Taiwan Strait into the wider western Pacific. This is not merely a demonstration of force. Rather, China appears to be testing mechanisms for isolating Taiwan by sea, assessing the island's response and normalising its presence around Taiwan. According to the Taiwanese authorities, 55 Chinese government vessels, including coast guard and research ships, were detected near the island in June. This represented an 83 per cent increase compared with May, when 30 vessels were recorded. The figures do not include Chinese activity near Taiwan-controlled islands close to the Chinese mainland. The increase therefore mainly reflects operations around Taiwan itself and along its maritime approaches to the Pacific. RECOMMENDED STORIESPanama, China agree to renew maritime shipping pactWhy the EU fined AliExpress €550 millionXi’s planned US visit remains on schedule, Rubio confirmsWhy is China moving artificial intelligence computing into space?Beijing's actions appear to serve several purposes. The first is to prepare for a potential blockade ofTaiwanwithout immediately launching a full-scale war. Taiwan is heavily dependent on maritime imports of energy, food, raw materials and industrial goods. If the traditional shipping routes through the Taiwan Strait were disrupted, ports on the island's eastern coast and supply lines across the Pacific would become critically important for sustaining the economy and receiving external assistance. Source: ReutersThis is why the presence of Chinese vessels east ofTaiwanis particularly alarming for Taipei. Beijing is demonstrating that any future attempt to isolate the island would not be confined to its western coast facing mainlandChina. Chinese forces are seeking to demonstrate that they could control access to Taiwan from several directions, including routes that might be used by ships arriving from Japan, the Philippines or the United States. Taiwan's defence planning already identifies an air and sea blockade as one of the most likely forms of Chinese escalation. Beijing could rapidly move from so-called grey-zone operations to a partial blockade and then, depending on political decisions, to broader military action. China's second objective is to wage what is often described as legal warfare. Instead of relying exclusively on naval warships, Beijing is increasingly using the China Coast Guard. Officially, such actions can be presented not as military operations but as law enforcement activities, maritime inspections or measures intended to protect navigation. This allows China to reinforce its claim that the waters around Taiwan fall under its jurisdiction. When China Coast Guard vessels regularly approach commercial ships, request information from their crews or announce inspections, Beijing gradually establishes its own pattern of control, even though other countries do not recognise its legal claims. Chinese vessels have reportedly requested information from commercial ships operating in waters near Taiwan. Although the vessels did not alter course, such contacts can be viewed as tests of a future system of informal maritime control. China is likely assessing how ship crews, shipping companies, insurers and Taiwan's coast guard respond to such requests. A third objective is to wear down Taiwan without crossing the threshold of open conflict. Taipei must constantly deploy vessels to monitor Chinese ships, track their movements, protect civilian shipping and maintain its maritime forces at a high level of readiness. China possesses significantly greater resources and can sustain longer deployments. Some China Coast Guard vessels were converted from former naval ships and have greater range, endurance and capabilities than conventional patrol vessels. Their deployment in groups near Taiwan's exclusive economic zone places additional pressure on the island's relatively limited maritime forces. This strategy also helps Beijing blur the distinction between peacetime activity and preparations for war. The more frequently Chinese vessels operate around the island, the more difficult it becomes for Taiwan to determine whether a new patrol is simply another episode of pressure or the beginning of an actual military operation. This uncertainty would be particularly significant in the event of a blockade. A blockade might not begin with a missile strike. It could start with the declaration of a temporary control zone, large-scale military exercises, demands for civilian ships to submit to inspections, or coast guard operations conducted under the pretext of maritime security. Beijing could seek to confront Taiwan and its partners with a difficult choice: comply with Chinese demands or become the first side to use force against vessels officially described as law enforcement ships rather than military units. The fourth objective is to respond to growing regional cooperation involving Taiwan. Chinese maritime activity has intensified as Japan, the Philippines and the United States strengthen security cooperation and increase their focus on the waters surrounding Taiwan. Beijing is signalling not only to Taipei but also to Washington, Tokyo and Manila that it intends to challenge their presence in the region and gradually impose its own rules beyond the Taiwan Strait. European countries have also expressed concern about China Coast Guard operations east of Taiwan, arguing that such activities could threaten freedom of navigation and contribute to unilateral changes to the regional status quo. China's activities may also have an intelligence-gathering dimension. Research and hydrographic vessels can survey water depth, currents, seabed conditions, underwater infrastructure and patterns of commercial shipping. Such information would be valuable for anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, monitoring undersea cables and planning naval operations in the event of a future crisis. This does not necessarily mean that China has already decided to blockade or invade Taiwan. A more likely explanation is that Beijing is developing a broad range of options that would allow it to increase pressure gradually and choose between different scenarios, ranging from psychological intimidation and limited inspections to the partial disruption of maritime supply routes. Source: ReutersIn response, Taiwan is preparing joint naval and coast guard exercises focused on protecting its key Pacific supply lines. The drills are expected to include the escort of civilian vessels, intelligence-sharing between military and law enforcement agencies, and measures to prevent China from establishing de facto control over commercial navigation. The main danger is that such competition could trigger escalation even in the absence of a deliberate decision to go to war. An attempt by a Chinese vessel to stop a commercial ship, a dangerous encounter between coast guard vessels, or a miscalculation by one of the crews could quickly trigger a crisis involving Taiwan's regional partners. The increase in Chinese vessel activity should therefore be viewed as part of a long-term strategy. Beijing is not necessarily preparing to attack Taiwan immediately. Instead, it is gradually restricting the island's freedom of action, testing international support for Taipei, applying psychological pressure and developing the operational capabilities required for a possible future blockade. The struggle over Taiwan is increasingly becoming a contest for control of its maritime communications. The waters east of the island and its Pacific supply routes may become the next major arena of confrontation between China and Taiwan. (If you possess specialized knowledge and wish to contribute, please reach out to us at[email protected]). News. Az