Zhu Rongji Dead at 98: His Dream of a ‘Clean Official’ in Communist China Ends in Failure - Vision Times
On the evening of Aug. 12 Beijing time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities officially announced that formerPremier Zhu Rongjihad died in Beijing at 11:06 a. m. on Aug. 12, 2026, at the age of 98. . . .
On the evening of Aug. 12 Beijing time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities officially announced that formerPremier Zhu Rongjihad died in Beijing at 11:06 a. m. on Aug. 12, 2026, at the age of 98. However, an individual believed to be a Beijing resident had already posted news of his death on the overseasX platformon the evening of Aug. 11. Overseas self-media commentator Jiang Wangzheng alsoclaimed on Xthat former CCP Premier Zhu Rongji had been staying at 301 Hospital since the beginning of this year and had reportedly returned to Shanghai last year. According to the post, Zhu died at 8:47 a. m. on Aug. 12. The subtle discrepancy between the official and unofficial release times once again highlights the dark reality of the CCP’s opaque political system in Zhongnanhai. In recent years, rumors that Zhu Rongji was “critically ill” or had died have repeatedly circulated in overseas media circles. This is not accidental. Within the CCP, Zhu has long been portrayed as a symbolic standard-bearer of the so-called “technocratic” and “economic reform” factions. Against the backdrop of the Xi Jinping administration’s “comprehensive shift to the left,” its promotion of “the state advancing while the private sector retreats,” and the concentration of power in the hands of one individual, Zhu has naturally become the focus of emotional expectations among members of the public and the party’s moderate faction, creating what is perceived as a “natural opposition” to the current political line. Looking back to the early years after Xi Jinping came to power, Zhu Rongji and other senior CCP figures made high-profile public appearances on several occasions, lending their support to Xi as he moved against political rivals and consolidated his power. However, after the 19th CCP National Congress, as the Xi administration pushed through constitutional amendments abolishing the presidential term limit and shifted toward Mao Zedong-style personal dictatorship, Zhu subsequently disappeared almost completely from public view. Multiple sources have claimed that Zhu was deeply dissatisfied with Xi’s constitutional changes and bid to remain in power, and chose to express his silent opposition through “complete retirement” and a refusal to publicly lend his support. Why did Zhu Rongji’s tough talk ultimately lose to the system?Looking back on Zhu Rongji’s career, particularly his years as premier, he became known for a series of forceful declarations about reform, corruption, and public service. He often invoked Zhuge Liang’s ideal of serving until his last breath and expressed a desire to be remembered as a “clean official” who served the people. In the end, however, many of those ambitions remained unfulfilled. SIGN UP FOR OUR FREE NEWSLETTERFor the best of our weekly content！There is something wrong, please try again laterSuccessYou are now signed up for our newsletterSuccessCheck your email to complete sign upThe 1998 ‘Minefield’ Declaration“Whether what lies ahead is a minefield or an abyss thousands of feet deep, I will move forward undaunted and without hesitation, devote myself to the task until the very end, and die only after I have exhausted myself. ”Reality: This statement once inspired the hopes of countless Chinese people for reform. At the time, Zhu Rongji emerged with an image of an iron-fisted leader, and many observers believed he would push for deeper institutional reforms. In retrospect, however, the path he forged was not one toward constitutional government and the rule of law, but rather toward market-oriented reforms within the CCP’s existing framework. Political power continued to monopolize resources, while the market gradually became a tool for the powerful and well-connected to pursue profits. Ultimately, China did not move toward political liberalization. Instead, under Xi Jinping, it underwent a comprehensive shift to the left, characterized by the state advancing while the private sector retreated and power being recentralized. The gains of reform suffered significant reversals. No matter how ambitious the reform agenda, it proved difficult to break through the ceiling imposed by an authoritarian system. Zhu’s lofty ambitions ultimately failed to alter the underlying logic of how power operates under Communist rule. The 1998 ‘one hundred coffins’ remark“In fighting corruption, we must first strike the tigers and then the wolves… Prepare one hundred coffins, and one of them can be mine. At worst, we will all go down together!”Reality: Zhu Rongji’s forceful declaration once sent shockwaves across China and led many to believe that the CCP was genuinely determined to wage war on corruption. Yet more than two decades later, corruption has not disappeared. Instead, it has expanded in ways that are increasingly institutionalized and systematic. The reason is not complicated: when political power lacks transparent oversight, officials simultaneously make the rules and distribute benefits, making corruption extremely difficult to eradicate. Under Xi Jinping, the anti-corruption campaign has been massive in scale, but it has also increasingly been viewed as an important tool for purging political rivals and reshaping the power structure. Without democratic oversight and a free press as safeguards, even the most aggressive anti-corruption campaign can address symptoms without treating the underlying causes. When power remains unchecked, corruption will inevitably return in another form. 1998: Condemning ‘tofu-dreg projects’“This is a tofu-dreg project, a damn project! A flood-control embankment built with billions of yuan in funding is actually this vulnerable!”In Chinese political jargon, “tofu-dreg projects” (豆腐渣工程, dòufu zhā gōngchéng) is a derogatory term meaning poorly constructed or unsafe public works, usually implying that corruption or cost-cutting caused the substandard quality. Reality: Zhu Rongji’s fury at the time exposed just one aspect of corruption in public works. Yet more than two decades later, people have continued to witness similar tragedies: from school buildings that collapsed during the Wenchuan earthquake to unfinished housing projects, collapsing bridges, and neglected water-conservation infrastructure across the country. Problems with the quality of public works have persisted, reflecting the deep-rooted institutional ills of rent-seeking and the diversion of public resources for private gain. When oversight is absent and accountability mechanisms fail, “tofu-dreg projects” are no longer merely construction problems—they become systemic problems. In a sense, the biggest “tofu-dreg project” is the power structure itself, which lacks effective checks and balances. READ MORE:Former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Known for Forceful Reform Efforts, Dies at 98Lou Jiwei, Critic of Xi’s ‘Made in China 2025,’ Resurfaces After Investigation Rumors2002: Warning of becoming ‘sinners against the nation’“If Hong Kong is ruined, it is not only you who will be responsible; we will be responsible, too. If Hong Kong is ruined in our hands after its return to the motherland, then wouldn’t we become sinners against the nation?”Reality: Looking back, Zhu Rongji’s concerns at the time appear remarkably prescient. From the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law to the completion of legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s former political and social environment has undergone profound changes. Once known as the “Pearl of the Orient” for its rule of law, freedoms, and international outlook, Hong Kong has gradually been incorporated into a governance model increasingly aligned with that of mainland China. The promise that “one country, two systems” would remain unchanged for 50 years has also collapsed. Hong Kong’s transformation today was not the result of mistakes by individual officials, but rather the consequence of the CCP system’s governing logic being extended comprehensively to Hong Kong. Zhu Rongji’s warning ultimately proved prophetic, but the system to which he had pledged his loyalty became the driving force behind this transformation. 2003: Refusing to be a ‘Mr. Nice Guy’“If this government is full of ‘Mr. Nice Guys,’ then I will have failed the people. We have to be the ‘bad guys. ’”Reality: Zhu Rongji was indeed not a typical “Mr. Nice Guy. ” He was willing to slam his fist on the table, berate officials, and push through sweeping reforms. Yet within the CCP system, personal forcefulness ultimately proved no match for vast networks of vested interests.