How the United States is Learning from Drone Warfare in Ukraine
The character of the Russian war against Ukraine has evolved dramatically over time. A war defined by maneuver warfare in 2022 during the initial Russian invasion and the Ukrainian counteroffensives. . .
The character of the Russian war against Ukraine has evolved dramatically over time. A war defined by maneuver warfare in 2022 during the initial Russian invasion and the Ukrainian counteroffensives inKharkivandKhersonhas devolved into positional warfare with the majority of the killing being done by drones. Drones have become a dominant feature of the war, used across the tactical, deep, and rear realms of the battlespace by both the Russians and Ukrainians. The Ukrainians, facing a numerically superior force with much more military hardware, have been forced to rapidly innovate their defense industry which has resulted in them harnessing the power of drones to conduct warfare in the 21st century. The United States has been closely monitoring the evolving nature of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and is working tolearn from thiswar in order to prepare for the future. Understanding that we are currently undergoing a revolution of military affairs, the United States seeks toscale its drone warfarecapabilities in order to prepare its forces for future conflicts. Current Doctrine Utilized in Ukraine: Tactical Realm of the BattlespaceIn the tactical realm, Ukrainian forces have employed small strike UAVs, commonly known as First Person View (FPV) drones, to executeprecise attacksagainst smaller targets including tanks, armored personnel carriers, armored fighting vehicles, mortars, artillery, and individual soldiers themselves. The tactical realm of the battlefield has been transformed by these drones as they constantly hover along the front lines, making maneuver warfare difficult; armor is often damaged or destroyed before it can engage as FPV drones track them down and take them out. Even artillery and MLRS systems located farther back from the frontline are vulnerable to FPV drone strikes. These systems are easy for drones to spot, making it difficult to execute “shoot and scoot” techniques which the Ukrainians conducted in the first several years of the war with great success while operating High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). Because anything in the open is easily spotted, artillery systems have been forced to adapt, relying oncamouflage and bunkersto defend themselves from the drone threat. The FPV drones conducting these strikes in the tactical realm can vary, as the Ukrainians have taken amodular approachto drone warfare, equipping drones to complete particular tasks such as flying directly into their targets with their payloads or by dropping their payloads onto their target. These drones includekamikaze drones,bomber drones,surveillance drones,utility drones, andcargo drones. Although drones may be designated for specific tasks, particularly when it comes to cargo drones which are designed to have a high payload capacity, their modularity allows the same drone platforms to be configured to serve numerous missions. This modular approach allows Ukrainian forces to easily adapt to battlefield conditions, changing their tactics when needed in order to combat the Russian threat. For example, Ukrainian forces targeting Russian forces within a trench system would begin an attack with bomber drones as the enemy would be lacking overhead cover. Once the Russians reached their dugout, the bomber-drone would not be as effective, but Ukrainian forces can simply reconfigure their drone from a bomber-drone to a kamikaze drone to better strike the Russian forces in the dugout. Ukraine’s embrace of modularity has allowed them to effectively destroy a variety of targets and dramatically reduce Russian success at taking ground. Ukraine’s tactical drone abilities have not only allowed them to defend their territory but also have allowed them to go on the offensive in sectors of the front such as in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. In February 2026, Ukrainian forces were able to establishtactical drone dominanceon this part of the front line, allowing their forces to counterattack and push Russian forces back from the critical hub of Pokrovske. This counterattack demonstrates the importance of tactical drone dominance in conducting both defensive and offensive operations. New Drone Doctrine Utilized in Ukraine: Deep and Rear Realms of the BattlespaceIn the deep realm, Ukraine has begun to embrace intermediate and mid-range strikes, targeting Russian logistics, ground lines of communications, and railways. There has been an emphasis ontargeting Russian air-defense and radar systemsin the temporarily occupied territories which has opened the airspace for deeper strikes in the deep and rear realms of the battlespace. Success in this campaign will also allow Ukraine to more efficiently employ itsrecently developed guided aerial bombas Ukrainian jets will be able to launch their payloads closer to the front line, allowing them to destroy targets not only in the tactical battlespace but in the deep area as well. Ukraine’s focus on intermediate and mid-range strikes against Russian forces have the potential to dramatically transform the battlefield. Their successful campaign of destroying Russian air-defense and radar systems have allowed drones such as theHornetandFP-1to target Russian communications and logistics across the deep realm, particularly in the temporarily occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimean regions. They have focused ontargetingthe E-58 highway running from Rostov-on-Don to Mariupol, to Melitipol and the H-20 highway, running from Donetsk to Mariupol. Ukrainian forces have been targeting Russian trucks along this route in an effort to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching the frontlines as part of their “logistics lockdown” strategy. Ukraine seeks to maintain fire control over the land bridge linking Russia to Crimea to degrade the Russian troops which rely on these supplies and reinforcements from the south. The Ukrainian campaign to degrade Russia’s air-defense and radar systems has allowed their drones to reach further into the rear elements of the temporarily occupied territories and Russia. Every night,Ukrainian forces launch long-range dronessuch as the FP-1 drone which wreak havoc on Russian oil depots, airfields, and other military or dual-use infrastructure located in the rear. This effort is meant to cause economic damage to the Russian war machine while also preventing the Russian rear from serving as a safe haven for military assets. Ukraine’s Drone ProductionUkraine has been successful in its drone warfare developments in large part due to its ability to scale up domestic industry. In 2026, Ukraine plans toproduce 7 millionmilitary drones which is a massive increase from the 4 million military drones produced in 2025. Ukraine has been able to scale up drone production through the private sector with numerous companies competing for contracts from the government and from specific brigades. The Ukrainian government benefits from foreignfinancing from their alliesin Europe which allows them to purchase these drones. Ukrainian companies can also receive directfinancing from foreignprivate actors as seen with the partnership which saw Axon Enterprise invest $10. 4 million into Buntar Aerospace. The drone technology and funding Ukraine receives from its allies is further invested into its own domestic industry, allowing the country to dramatically scale-up its drone production during the war. Implementation and Training in the United StatesThe United States has been learning lessons from the evolution of warfare taking place in Ukraine, seeking to integrate FPV drones into its force structure. The United States seeks to train its armed forces to operate FPV drones in combat environments to adapt its forces to the new realities of 21st century warfare. This was demonstrated at Marine Corps Base Quantico, where American Marines, under the command of Colonel Scott Cuomo, have beenimproving their piloting and targetingwith FPV drones. The training of American forces on FPV drones was further demonstrated by US Marines with the Battalion Landing Team 3/6, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. They utilized the Nero Archer FPV drone system in training, becoming thefirst operational unitin the Marine Corps to possess an attack drone capability. The dire need to train American forces on drone warfare has led to the creation of an official drone-fighting handbook for US Marines. This handbook titled,Attack Drone Employment,“develops and seeks to standardize common sUAS procedures for the infantry, fires, reconnaissance, and aviation units that will operate together with this capability”. The handbook seeks to ensure that American forces embrace and are prepared for drone warfare. United States Drone ProductionRecognizing the ongoing revolution in military affairs, the United States Armed Forces increasingly see FPV drones as an integral component of its future force. As part of theDrone Dominance initiative, the War Department will spend $1 billion on FPV drones over the next two years with the goal of purchasing over 200,000 drones by 2027. The initiative has already seen results as by May 2026 the Marine Corps fields3,500 FPV drones. While a pittance compared to the number of drones a Ukrainian brigade employs in a week, Colonel Cuomocautions, “Rewind your brain to October. We had zero FPV attack drones in the United States. We have over 3,500 right now. ” While a few thousand is better than none at all, the United States has plenty of work to do to scale up its drone production capacity. The $1 billion allocated for the development of drones is certainly a good start, but much greater funding will need to be allocated if the United States is to truly harness the capabilities of drone warfare. The development of FPV drones in the United States does not solely focus on their use in the tactical realm, but also in the deep and rear realms of the battlespace. Like Ukraine, the United Statespossesses the Hornet strike drone, deploying it at numerous training areas across Europe including bases in Lithuania, Poland, and Germany. The Hornet has gained traction across United States Army formations in Europe as the Army has witnessed the Hornet’s devastating impact on Russian communications and logistics amidst their ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The United States has also developed theLUCAS loitering munitionlow-cost unmanned combat system, an American analogue to the Shahed-136 deployed by Iran. The LUCAS costs $35,000 giving the United States military a less costly precision weapon that can strike enemy targets instead of launching a $2. 5 million Tomahawk cruise missile. The LUCAS can travel hundreds of miles autonomously following its attack path once its target coordinates are entered. The Hornet and LUCAS both demonstrate that the United States is committed to not only developing drone technologies for the tactical realm, but also for the deep and rear realms of the battlespace. Conclusion: A New BeginningThe conduct of warfare in the 21st century has been dramatically altered due to the use of drones which can achieve effects in the tactical, deep, and rear realms of the battlespace. The Ukrainians have embraced the use of drones and made them an integral part of their war effort as they seek to defend their country and liberate their lands and people. Their successes in drone warfare can provide lessons for the United States as we seek to harness the powers of drones in modern warfare. Drones have proven to achieve devastating effects in all three facets of the battlespace: eliminating infantry and enemy armor in the tactical space, striking air-defenses, radar systems, and trucks in the deep area, and devastating critical infrastructure such as oil depots and munitions factories in the deep realm. For a low price, drones can produce devastating effects. They have proven to be a force multiplier, and the United States must embrace their use if they are to compete with adversaries including Russia and China. To ensure the United States does not fall behind, there needs to be a much larger commitment to building up our drone production and embrace the use of drones in warfare. This means allocating more funds for drone production and embracing the ingenuity of the commercial sector to produce drones as the Ukrainians have done. The United States must also rapidly incorporate drones into its force structure, ensuring that we are able to properly use them in all three realms of the battlespace. Having cheap and efficient alternatives to expending manpower or expensive munitions while still achieving the same goals is an integral component of conducting warfare in the 21st century. The United States must pick up the pace and embrace this new era of warfare. Disclaimer:This article reflects the opinion of the authors and not that of the United States Army War College or the United States Army.